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WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH 
AND SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER POST-SUMMUM 
Scott W. Gaylord* 
Across the country, federal, state, and local legislative bodies begin 
their meetings with prayer.  Yet, as recent challenges to sectarian 
legislative prayer demonstrate, legislative prayer rests uneasily at the 
intersection of the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses.  While the 
government has the right to speak for itself, many contend that it is 
precluded from engaging in paradigmatic religious activity, such as 
sectarian prayer.  As a result, although legislative prayer has been 
part of the “fabric of our society” since at least the First Continental 
Congress, sectarian prayer teeters on the brink of unconstitutionality. 
Despite the pervasiveness of legislative prayer and the importance of 
the constitutional issues it raises, the United States Supreme Court did 
not decide a legislative prayer case until Marsh v. Chambers in 1983.  
In Marsh, the Court upheld legislative prayers generally but did not 
explain how Marsh fit within the Court’s broader Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  Subsequent Supreme Court and lower court 
decisions, therefore, have treated Marsh as a narrow exception to the 
Supreme Court’s general Establishment Clause rules. 
This Article examines recent developments that undermine the 
traditional view of Marsh as a limited exception and places Marsh at 
the center of the Court’s current view of facially religious government 
speech.  In particular, after analyzing the Court’s discussions of 
legislative prayer in Marsh and Allegheny, this Article focuses on the 
recent flood of challenges to sectarian legislative prayers, comparing 
the widely divergent conclusions reached by the seven circuit courts 
that have heard such cases.  It then explores how the Supreme Court’s 
2009 decision in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City provides a new lens 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law.  The author had primary 
responsibility for preparing the “Brief of Amicus Curiae Independence Law Center in Support of 
Forsyth County, North Carolina” in Joyner v. Forsyth County, North Carolina, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Record No. 10-1232, which currently is on appeal to the Fourth Circuit 
and which directly implicates many of the issues discussed in this Article. 
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through which Marsh may be interpreted, contending that the Court’s 
“recently minted” government speech doctrine (1) is inconsistent with 
the endorsement test and, in fact, (2) mandates the Establishment 
Clause test the Court first developed in Marsh.  In the last Part, this 
Article considers the constitutionality of sectarian and nonsectarian 
legislative prayer in light of Marsh and Summum, arguing that, under 
this “new” standard, federal, state, and local governments can 
continue to engage in legislative prayer, even if those prayers contain 
sectarian references. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Marsh v. Chambers1 is generally known as the case that held 
legislative prayer to be consistent with the requirements of the 
Establishment Clause.  But Marsh is also commonly known as an outlier 
in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and as an 
exception to the Court’s traditional rules, such as the Lemon and 
endorsement tests.2  This reputation resulted, in part, from the Court’s 
failure to explain how Marsh fit within existing Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  The Court approved legislative prayer without 
mentioning, let alone distinguishing, Lemon v. Kurtzman, which set 
forth the then-dominant Establishment Clause test.3  Moreover, the 
Court’s subsequent discussion of Marsh in Allegheny and Lee reinforced 
the view that Marsh was justified only by virtue of the “unique history” 
of legislative prayer.4  Although neither case involved legislative prayer, 
both suggested that Marsh should not be extended to other contexts, 
such as holiday displays or high school graduations. 
But there is another, more fundamental reason why courts treat Marsh 
as an exception: legislative prayer sits uneasily at the intersection of the 
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses.  While the government has the 
right to speak for itself, it cannot engage in paradigmatic religious 
activity, such as sectarian prayer—i.e., legislative prayers that make 
express references to specific deities.5  Thus, even if Marsh allows for 
 1. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court is carving out an exception to the 
Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to accommodate legislative 
prayer.”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987) (“The Lemon test has been applied in all 
cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers, where the Court held that the Nebraska 
Legislature’s practice of opening a session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.” (citation omitted)); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Ga., 547 F.3d 1263, 1269 
(11th Cir. 2008) (“Our ‘delicate and fact-sensitive’ inquiry is evident in the area of legislative prayer, 
which the Supreme Court, in Marsh . . . , excepted from the traditional analysis under the Establishment 
Clause.”); id. at 1286 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting) (“Marsh is an outlier in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.”). 
 3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 4. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585 (1992). 
 5. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious 
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010); Robert Luther III, “Unity Through Division”: Religious 
Liberty and the Virtue of Pluralism in the Context of Legislative Prayer Controversies, 43 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 1 (2009); Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
3
Gaylord: WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH AND SECTARIAN LEGISLAT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
G-GAYLORD 8/4/2011  2:15:21 PM 
1020 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
generic legislative prayers, lower courts and commentators contend that 
it cannot permit sectarian references because through such prayers the 
government would be espousing specific deities and religious beliefs, 
which directly violates the Establishment Clause.  Consequently, these 
groups argue that Marsh must be limited to nonsectarian invocations. 
Yet, Marsh does not expressly limit its holding in this way.  In fact, 
the Court in Marsh states that courts should not “parse the content of a 
particular prayer” unless there is evidence that the government intended 
to exploit “the prayer opportunity . . . to proselytize or advance any one, 
or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”6  But if courts cannot look at 
the content of the legislative prayer, how can they distinguish between 
sectarian and nonsectarian prayers?  Is the distinction irrelevant under 
Marsh?  And, if not, does the same test apply to each type of prayer 
under the Establishment Clause? 
In the last few years, several circuit courts have addressed these 
questions and, as a result, have brought Marsh out of the shadows and 
into the Establishment Clause spotlight.  Given the uncertain status of 
Marsh, these courts understandably have struggled in deciding whether 
the Establishment Clause permits sectarian legislative prayer and have 
reached different conclusions.  For example, while the Eleventh Circuit 
approved a Georgia policy permitting sectarian legislative prayer,7 the 
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that certain sectarian 
invocations were unconstitutional.8  The Fifth Circuit originally issued a 
fractured opinion rejecting sectarian prayer,9 but the en banc court, 
unable to garner a majority view on the proper scope of Marsh, 
ultimately dismissed the case on standing grounds.10  The Seventh 
Circuit disposed of a case in the same way.11  And the Fourth Circuit 
1171 (2009); Robert J. Delahunty, “Varied Carols”: Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 517 (2006); Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the 
Establishment Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2008); 
Robert Luther III & David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from the “Prayer Police”: Why the First 
Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative Prayer and Demands a “Practice Focused” Analysis, 48 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569 (2008); Anne Abrell, Note, Just a Little Talk With Jesus: Reaching the 
Limits of the Legislative Prayer Exception, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 145 (2007); Jeremy G. Mallory, 
Comment, “An Officer of the House Which Chooses Him, and Nothing More”: How Should Marsh v. 
Chambers Apply to Rotating Chaplains?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (2006). 
 6. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95. 
 7. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d 1263. 
 8. Stein v. Plainwell Cmty. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion); Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 9. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe I), 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 10. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe II), 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 11. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Rep. of the Ind. Gen. Assembly (Hinrichs II), 506 F.3d 
584 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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currently is considering an appeal of a district court decision that struck 
down a policy that permitted sectarian prayers at the beginning of 
County Commissioner meetings.12 
Amid all of this uncertainty, the Supreme Court recently decided 
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City,13 which this Article argues establishes 
a “new” standard for facially religious government speech, such as 
legislative prayers.  But, as it turns out, the new standard is Marsh’s old 
one.  If the government “controls” the speech, it may engage in facially 
religious speech provided that it does not have an impermissible motive.  
In other words, consistent with Marsh, sectarian and nonsectarian 
legislative prayers are constitutional provided that the government does 
not promote or disparage a particular religion: “[W]here, as here, there is 
no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief[,] . . . it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to 
parse the content of a particular prayer.”14  Thus, post-Summum, Marsh 
is no longer an exception but rather a cornerstone of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause analysis of legislative prayer and other forms of 
facially religious government speech. 
To explore this recent development in the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Part I of this Article focuses on the 
Court’s reasoning in Marsh, specifically how it diverged from the then-
current Lemon test and how the Court’s subsequent reliance on the 
endorsement test limited Marsh’s scope.  Part II explores the current 
circuit split regarding sectarian invocations, arguing that, in light of 
Summum¸ Marsh has assumed a central place within the Court’s 
Establishment Clause analysis, fulfilling the broad role that Justice 
Kennedy and three other Justices championed in dissent in Allegheny.  
Finally, Part III considers the constitutionality of a particular prayer 
policy modeled on the policy that the Fourth Circuit is currently 
considering in Joyner v. Forsyth County.  This Article argues that this 
type of prayer policy—which is open to all religious groups in the 
community and allows diverse religious leaders to make sectarian 
references to their own deities—is constitutional under Marsh.  
Moreover, this is true whether the legislative prayers are deemed to be 
government speech under Summum or private speech under the Court’s 
 12. Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2009). 
 13. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 14. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).  See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination 
cannot be officially preferred over another.”). 
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2010 decision in Salazar v. Buono.15  As a result, Marsh is no longer an 
outlier; rather, the Court now embraces the principles of Marsh and is 
apt to apply those principles to facially religious government speech.  
Stated differently, the exception has become the rule. 
I. THE MARSH “EXCEPTION”: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE 
UNIQUE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
Despite the prevalence of legislative prayer at the time of the 
Founding,16 the Constitution does not expressly address the practice.  
The religion clauses of the First Amendment, which apply to the states 
and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment,17 provide 
only that the government “shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”18  
Given the importance of religion in our nation’s history as well as in the 
lives of many of its citizens, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court 
has decided numerous cases involving the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses.  What is surprising, however, is that, given the long-
standing history of legislative prayer in the United States,19 the Court  
did not decide a case challenging legislative prayer until Marsh in 
1983.20 
By the time it finally heard a legislative prayer case, the Court 
appeared to have settled on the Lemon test as the governing 
Establishment Clause framework.  Pursuant to this three-prong test, to 
survive Establishment Clause review, the challenged government action 
(1) “must have a secular legislative purpose,” (2) “its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” 
and (3) “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”21  Applying this test to the facts in Marsh, the Eighth Circuit 
 15. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 16. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787–88. 
 17. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (assuming that the First 
Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in allowing the state 
to reimburse parents for the cost of public transportation to public and parochial schools). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 19. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (“[T]he practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued 
without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”). 
 20. For a detailed account of the history of congressional chaplains, which directly implicates the 
history surrounding legislative prayer, see Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009).  Although various challenges were made to the practice 
throughout our nation’s history, politics, congressional wrangling, and even standing requirements 
prevented the Supreme Court from hearing a challenge to legislative prayer until Marsh.  See, e.g., Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968). 
 21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the City 
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held that the invocations at the start of Nebraska’s legislative sessions 
violated the Establishment Clause.22  Although the Eighth Circuit’s 
analysis was unremarkable in light of Lemon, the United States Supreme 
Court’s analysis had a novel and unexpectedly originalist bent.  Instead 
of applying—or even mentioning—Lemon, the Marsh majority looked 
to “historical evidence” to determine “what the draftsmen intended the 
Establishment Clause to mean” as well as “how they thought that Clause 
applied to the [legislative prayer] practice authorized by the First 
Congress.”23  Marsh’s new “test” for legislative prayer, though, directly 
conflicted with Lemon.  And as a majority of the Court began shifting 
from Lemon to the endorsement test, this conflict only increased, 
entrenching Marsh as an exception to the Court’s general Establishment 
Clause rules.24 
A. Marsh and Legislative Prayer: The Shift Away from Lemon 
For more than a century, the Nebraska legislature began its legislative 
sessions with an invocation.  In 1965, Nebraska hired Robert E. Palmer, 
a Presbyterian minister, to give the opening prayer at the start of each 
legislative session.  For the next sixteen years, Nebraska paid Mr. 
Palmer a monthly stipend for each month the legislature was in session.  
Although his prayers originally contained some expressly Christian 
references, the minister removed specific references to “Christ” in 1980 
and subsequently gave only nondenominational invocations.25  Despite 
the generic character of the legislative prayers, Ernie Chambers, a 
member of the Nebraska legislature, filed an action to enjoin both the 
practice of having legislative prayers and the state’s paying the minister 
out of state funds. 
Although the district court found the prayer practice constitutional, it 
struck down Nebraska’s paying its chaplain out of state funds.  The 
of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 22. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234–35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786 (“Applying the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman . . . , the [Eighth Circuit] 
held that the chaplaincy practice violated all three elements of the test: the purpose and primary effect of 
selecting the same minister for 16 years and publishing his prayers was to promote a particular religious 
expression; use of state money for compensation and publication led to entanglement.”). 
 23. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790. 
 24. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 872 n.2 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]his unique history’ justified carving out 
an exception for the specific practice in question.  Given that the [Marsh] decision upholding this 
practice was expressly limited to its facts, then, it would stand the Establishment Clause on its head to 
extract from it a broad rule permitting the funding of religious activities.” (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
791)). 
 25. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14. 
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Eighth Circuit, reversing in part, held that both practices violated all 
three prongs of the Lemon test: 
 Such a practice violates all three elements of the constitutional test 
applicable here.  The purpose of the practice as a whole must be to 
advance and give preference to one religious view over others. . . . 
 The primary effect of the practice as a whole is unmistakably to 
advance religion and to give preference to one religious view.  The state 
has placed its official seal of approval on one religious view for sixteen 
years and has stood behind that seal with its funds—both to compensate 
the minister and to publish his prayer books. . . . 
 The prayer practice also entangles the state with religion in precisely 
the manner warned of in Bogen.  By using state monies to compensate the 
same minister for sixteen years and to publish his prayer books, the state 
engenders serious political division along religious lines.26 
In so holding, the Eighth Circuit foreshadowed Justice Brennan’s 
dissent.  According to Justice Brennan, allowing the same Presbyterian 
minister to give Judeo–Christian prayers for sixteen years, regardless of 
whether such prayers were “nondenominational,” demonstrated the 
government’s intent to promote that denomination over all others.27  The 
effect of Nebraska’s policies was to promote religion over non-religion 
and to promote Presbyterianism over other sects. 
Although Lemon was dispositive for the Eighth Circuit and the Marsh 
dissenters, the Court’s majority opinion did not mention Lemon or Engel 
v. Vitale.28  Instead of relying on Establishment Clause precedent, the 
majority focused on what it viewed as more fundamental—the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause at the time of the Founding.  According to 
the majority, legislative prayer was “deeply embedded in the history and 
tradition of this country,”29 reaching back to at least 1774 when the 
Continental Congress, like Nebraska’s unicameral legislature, “open[ed] 
its sessions with a prayer offered by a paid chaplain.”30  Moreover, the 
 26. Chambers, 675 F.2d at 234–35.  Although frequently overlooked, the Eighth Circuit 
specifically acknowledged that, even under Lemon, neither legislative prayers nor retaining a paid 
chaplain are per se unconstitutional: “We do not hold that invocations alone are unconstitutional.  
Indeed, Bogen demonstrates that some invocation practices can be constitutionally conducted.  Nor do 
we hold that a legislative chaplaincy, even a paid chaplaincy, is per se unconstitutional.”  Id. at 235. 
 27. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the ‘purpose’ of legislative 
prayer is preeminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident.  ‘To invoke Divine 
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws’ . . . is nothing but a religious act. . . .  The 
‘primary effect’ of legislative prayer is also clearly religious. . . .  [I]nvocations in Nebraska’s legislative 
halls explicitly link religious belief and observance to the power and prestige of the State.”). 
 28. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding, in the first case dealing with government-sponsored prayer, 
that the state could not create a prayer to be recited at the start of each school day). 
 29. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. 
 30. Id. at 787. 
8
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Court emphasized that the Founders approved the language of the Bill of 
Rights three days after the First Congress, “as one of its early items of 
business, adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session 
with prayer.”31 
But historical practice was critical to the Marsh majority not because 
it validated all contemporaneous religious practices but because it 
revealed the meaning of the Establishment Clause: 
Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause did not 
view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that 
Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has 
continued without interruption ever since that early session of 
Congress. . . . 
 . . . In this context, historical evidence sheds light not only on what 
the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on 
how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the 
First Congress—their actions reveal their intent.32 
Because the First Congress expressly provided for paid chaplains while 
finalizing the language of the First Amendment, legislative prayer is 
consistent with both the intent of the Founders and the meaning of the 
religion clauses: “Marsh stands for the proposition, not that specific 
practices common in 1791 are an exception to the otherwise broad 
sweep of the Establishment Clause, but rather that the meaning of the 
Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practice and 
understandings.”33 
Two important and often overlooked consequences flow from the 
majority’s appeal to history.  First, the history of legislative prayer 
demonstrates that the Establishment Clause does not require the 
complete separation of church and state.  In certain circumstances, such 
as legislative invocations, the government can engage in facially 
religious speech even if it has the effect of promoting religion over non-
religion.  Rather than threatening Establishment Clause principles, the 
long-standing history of legislative prayers reflects an important, shared 
system of beliefs upon which our country and its institutions were 
founded: 
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, 
there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with 
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.  To invoke Divine 
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these 
 31. Id. at 787–88. 
 32. Id. at 788–89. 
 33. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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circumstances, an “establishment” of religion or a step toward 
establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely 
held among the people of this country.  As Justice Douglas observed, 
“[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.”34 
Second, although historical practice may help determine the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause, it does not, by itself, provide a means to 
distinguish legislative prayers that are consistent with the Establishment 
Clause from those that are not.  The two hundred year unbroken history 
indicates that “the delegates did not consider opening prayers as a 
proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the government’s 
‘official seal of approval on one religious view,’”35 but not all legislative 
prayer policies are constitutional: “To invoke Divine guidance on a 
public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these 
circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward 
establishment.”36  Hence, following its review of historical practices, the 
Court does something that most courts and commentators have 
ignored—it sets out a new Establishment Clause test for legislative 
prayers.  To better understand the nature and scope of this test, one must 
look not only at the majority’s opinion, but also at what it necessarily 
rejects—the reasoning of the Lemon test. 
1. Marsh’s New Establishment Clause Test—Impermissible 
Government Intent 
Because historical practice does not justify all forms of legislative 
prayer,37 the Marsh majority needed to provide a test for distinguishing 
between constitutional and unconstitutional legislative prayers.38  And 
 34. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (emphasis added); id. at 791 (There is “no real threat to the Establishment Clause arising 
from a practice of prayer similar to that now challenged.”) (emphasis added). 
 37. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (“It is 
obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long 
use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.  Yet an 
unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast aside.”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (“Standing 
alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees . . . .”). 
 38. The Court frequently has applied specific Establishment Clause tests in certain situations but 
not others: “Experience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily 
be reduced to a single test.”  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 
(1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  Accordingly, it is not surprising 
that an Establishment Clause test developed in the context of display cases would not apply in a 
different context, namely, legislative prayers: “The Court today does only what courts must do in many 
Establishment Clause cases—focus on specific features of a particular government action to ensure that 
it does not violate the Constitution.”  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
10
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the majority did just that in the last section of its opinion.  In particular, 
to determine whether Nebraska’s prayer policy was constitutional, the 
Court looked at the specific “features” of the challenged policy, namely 
the selection process, the use of public funds to pay the chaplain, and the 
use of Judeo–Christian prayers.39  The Court, however, did not subject 
each feature to the Lemon test.  Instead, given that the Establishment 
Clause generally permits legislative prayer, the majority focused on the 
government’s intent—whether it meant to use the prayer opportunity for 
an impermissibly religious purpose.  That is, because the Founders did 
not intend the Establishment Clause to preclude invocations, legislative 
prayer violates that Establishment Clause only if the government 
engages in the practice for improper reasons—to proselytize, promote, 
or disparage a particular religion.  In this way, Marsh is consistent with 
the overarching requirement of the Establishment Clause: “The clearest 
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”40 
For example, with respect to Nebraska’s selecting the same 
Presbyterian minister to give the legislative invocations for sixteen 
years, the Court held that there is no Establishment Clause violation 
“[a]bsent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an 
impermissible motive.”41  That is, unless there is evidence that the 
government used the selection process to “advance[] the beliefs of a 
particular church,”42 the Nebraska legislature could retain the same 
person to give the invocations without running afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.  Similarly, the majority found no Establishment 
Clause problem in paying the invocation speaker with public funds.  
Given that the first Congress and various states paid their chaplains out 
of public funds, such “remuneration is grounded in historic practice” and 
does not violate the Establishment Clause.43 
The fact that Nebraska’s legislative prayers were in the Judeo–
Christian tradition, however, might create an Establishment Clause 
problem even though chaplain selection and remuneration did not.  Even 
if the Founders understood the Establishment Clause to allow for 
legislative prayer, they did not intend to permit the government to 
“advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”44  But, so 
852 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 39. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792–93; id. at 792 (“We turn then to the question of whether any features 
of the Nebraska practice violate the Establishment Clause.”). 
 40. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
 41. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 793. 
 43. Id. at 794. 
 44. Id. at 794–95. 
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the argument goes, Judeo–Christian prayers violate the Constitution 
because they do just that. 
The majority rejected this line of argument, recognizing that by its 
very nature prayer is always from some perspective;45 as a practical 
matter, the person giving an invocation cannot give a prayer that refers 
to all religious faiths or traditions.  Moreover, the practice of legislative 
prayer that had “become part of the fabric of our society” was from this 
same Judeo–Christian perspective.46  Accordingly, the Court declined to 
scrutinize the particular perspective (i.e., the content of the legislative 
prayer) unless there was evidence that the government sought to use the 
prayer to advance a particular faith: “The content of the prayer is not of 
concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer 
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief.”47  As with the chaplain selection 
process, the intent of the legislature was critical to the Court’s analysis.  
When deciding whether a legislative prayer violates the Establishment 
Clause, courts must first determine whether there is any indication of 
improper motive.  And Justice Stevens, in his Marsh dissent, interpreted 
the majority’s decision in just this way: “The Court holds that a 
chaplain’s 16-year tenure is constitutional as long as there is no proof 
that his reappointment ‘stemmed from an impermissible motive.’  Thus, 
once again, the Court makes the subjective motivation of legislators the 
decisive criterion for judging the constitutionality of a state legislative 
practice.”48 
Under Marsh’s impermissible intent test, then, legislative invocations 
are constitutional provided that the government neither intends to 
promote one faith through the selection of the prayer-giver nor 
improperly uses the prayer opportunity to advance or disparage a 
particular faith.  In this way, Marsh builds off Lemon’s purpose prong 
and rejects the other prongs.  But, instead of burdening the government 
by requiring it to show a secular purpose, one challenging the legislative 
prayer must demonstrate that the government has the impermissible 
 45. See, e.g., Delahunty, supra note 5, at 522 (“Every prayer, by its very nature, reflects and 
conveys a particular system of beliefs about the nature of ultimate reality and is thus ‘sectarian.’”).  For 
a more detailed analysis of the Establishment Clause problems related to mandated nonsectarian prayer, 
see John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 515 
(2004); William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of 
National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 199 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, 
Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146, 163 (1986); and the sources cited in 
supra note 5. 
 46. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
 47. Id. at 794–95. 
 48. Id. at 823 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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intent “to proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or belief.”49  Thus, 
Marsh does more than simply create a limited exception to the Lemon 
test; Marsh establishes a new way of analyzing facially religious 
government speech, articulating an “intent” standard that, at the time, 
was unique to legislative prayers. 
2. Justice Brennan and the Lemon Test—What the Majority Opinion 
Does Not Mean 
The majority and dissents had two fundamental disagreements regarding 
the scope of the Establishment Clause: (1) the applicable test for 
legislative prayer and (2) the underlying purpose of the Establishment 
Clause.  As if to highlight these differences, Justice Brennan 
immediately tried to limit the scope of Marsh, characterizing it as an 
exception to the Court’s general Establishment Clause rules: “That [the 
Court did not apply any of the traditional Establishment Clause tests] 
simply confirms that the Court is carving out an exception to the 
Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause 
doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer.”50  Instead of invoking 
history to create an exception, Justice Brennan would have applied 
Lemon and held Nebraska’s legislative prayer policy unconstitutional: 
“In sum, I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to 
apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they 
would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”51  
Echoing the Eighth Circuit, Justice Brennan claimed that Nebraska’s 
legislative invocations violated all three prongs of the Lemon test.  For 
Justice Brennan, it was “self-evident” that the purpose of legislative 
prayer—“‘invok[ing] Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with 
making the laws’”—was preeminently religious.52  To the extent such 
religious activity serves any secular function, that function can be 
accomplished just as easily through non-religious means.53  Whereas the 
majority invoked cases that expressly allow the government to consider 
religion,54 Justice Brennan appealed to the public school cases in which 
 49. Id. at 794–95 (majority opinion). 
 50. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 800–01. 
 52. Id. at 797. 
 53. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 673 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the endorsement test and stating “I fail to see why prayer is 
the only way to convey these messages; appeals to patriotism, moments of silence, and any number of 
other approaches would be as effective, were the only purposes at issue the ones described by the Lynch 
concurrence”). 
 54. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a state 
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the Court struck down the posting of the Ten Commandments, banned 
the teaching of creationism, and prohibited state-sponsored Bible 
reading in schools.55  Because the purpose of the religious activity is the 
same in the schools and in the legislature—to advance religion over non-
religion—both violate Lemon’s purpose prong. 
According to Justice Brennan, Nebraska’s invocations also failed the 
second prong of Lemon because the “‘primary effect’ of legislative 
prayer is also clearly religious.”56  Drawing on the school prayer cases 
once again, Justice Brennan focused on two impermissible effects of 
having official prayers: the “indirect coercive pressure upon religious 
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion”57 
and the “explicit[] link” created between “religious belief and 
observance [and] the power and prestige of the State.”58  The latter was 
of greater concern to Justice Brennan because even the “‘mere 
appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and 
State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of 
some by reason of the power conferred.’”59  Moreover, some people, 
learning that the government has “linked” itself with religion through 
legislative prayer, will feel disaffected.  Yet, for Justice Brennan, the 
Establishment Clause was meant to insure “that no American should at 
any point feel alienated from his government because that government 
has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’ point of view 
on a matter of religion.”60 
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that Nebraska’s prayer policy created 
an “excessive entanglement” between the government and religion.  This 
program that reimbursed parents for the costs of transporting their children to parochial schools on buses 
operated by the public transportation system); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (finding that 
beneficial grants for higher education at religious schools were constitutional); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of 
City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that a state statute exempting religious institutions 
from real property tax was constitutional). 
 55. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (holding that the “pre-eminent purpose” of a 
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms was “plainly 
religious in nature” despite the legislature’s professed secular purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 
97, 107–09 (1968) (striking down a state statute banning the teaching of evolution in public schools 
because of its primarily religious purpose); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
223–24 (1963) (finding that a public school’s practice of starting each day with a Bible reading and 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer violated the Establishment Clause). 
 56. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 57. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
 58. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. (quoting Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982)). 
 60. Id. at 805–06.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from “send[ing] a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community”). 
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entanglement took two forms.  First, the government “program might 
involve the state impermissibly in monitoring and overseeing religious 
affairs” by requiring the state to select an appropriate chaplain and to 
monitor that person to make sure that person gives prayers that conform 
to the requirements of the Establishment Clause.61  Second, legislative 
prayer results in entanglement because of its “divisive political 
potential,” which creates controversy along religious lines.62 
Moreover, in applying Lemon to legislative prayer, Justice Brennan 
highlighted a central disagreement regarding the purpose of the 
Establishment Clause.  Whereas the majority focused on the history at 
the time of and subsequent to the drafting of the First Amendment, 
Justice Brennan relied on a much broader history—the frequently 
violent history of sixteenth and seventeenth century England and 
Europe: “The Establishment Clause embodies a judgment, born of a 
long and turbulent history, that, in our society, religion ‘must be a 
private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of 
private choice . . . .’”63  Because religion is a private matter, the 
government should not and cannot interject itself into religious affairs 
such as legislative prayers.  According to Justice Brennan, the 
Establishment Clause requires the government to remain neutral 
between and among religions as well as between religion and non-
religion: “‘Government in our democracy, state and national, must be 
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may 
not . . . aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against 
another. . . .  The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality 
between religion and nonreligion.’”64  As a result, while the majority 
would allow legislative prayers unless there was evidence that the 
government intended to proselytize or advance a particular religion 
through the invocations,65 the dissent would “strike[e] down all official 
legislative invocations.”66 
The contrast between the majority and Justice Brennan is instructive 
for at least two reasons.  First, it clarifies the majority’s “intent” test by 
showing what it does not mean.  Because the Establishment Clause 
allows for legislative prayer, the majority necessarily rejected Justice 
Brennan’s claim that such prayers are unconstitutional because they 
“explicitly link religious belief [and] the power and prestige of the 
 61. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 798–99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Id. at 802 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)). 
 64. Id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968)). 
 65. Id. at 794–95 (majority opinion). 
 66. Id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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State . . . ‘in the minds of some.’”67  The majority declined to apply 
Lemon’s effect prong because the Establishment Clause analysis does 
not depend on the effect of the government practice on the minds of 
third party observers.  That some, “like respondent, believe that to have 
prayer in this context risks the beginning of the establishment . . . is not 
well founded [because] [t]he unbroken practice for two centuries in the 
National Congress . . . gives abundant assurance that there is no real 
threat ‘while this Court sits.’”68  Even though the majority and dissent 
agreed that “the federal judiciary should not sit as a board of censors on 
individual prayers,” they disagreed regarding the best way to avoid the 
government’s taking on such a role.69  Whereas the dissent avoided the 
problem by prohibiting legislative prayer, the majority relied on the 
judiciary to monitor and assess the reasons for the government’s actions 
as opposed to the content of specific prayers.  Regardless of the effect of 
the legislative prayer on adults, who are assumed capable of warding off 
the dual threats of religious indoctrination and peer pressure,70 the 
majority interpreted the Establishment Clause to generally allow for 
legislative prayer, thereby avoiding the need to review the content of 
individual prayers. 
Second, Justice Brennan’s dissent demonstrates why the Court’s 
subsequent adoption of the endorsement test further limits the apparent 
 67. Id. at 798.  The dissent’s “explicit linking” test still survives, at least in some opinions.  
Recently, the Middle District of North Carolina reintroduced the Marsh dissenters’ test in a challenge to 
sectarian invocations given at the start of County Commissioner meetings in Forsyth County, North 
Carolina.  Instead of applying Marsh, the district judge claimed that the central inquiry is whether the 
sectarian invocations “have the effect of affiliating the Government with that particular faith or belief.”  
Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2009) (on appeal to 
the Fourth Circuit) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
603 (1989)).  That is, the court limited Marsh to nonsectarian invocations and reverted back to the 
endorsement test (the modern incarnation of Lemon) when analyzing sectarian legislative prayer.  
Because it rejected the “effect of linking” test, Marsh also is inconsistent with the district court’s test as 
well. 
 68. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 70. The majority did not rely on the dissent’s school prayer cases because the “heightened 
concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and 
secondary public schools” do not apply in the legislative prayer context where the listeners are adults 
who are free to come and go as they please.  Id. at 792 (majority opinion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 596–97 (1992) (“Inherent differences between the public school system and a session of a state 
legislature distinguish this case from Marsh. . . .  The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state 
legislature where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of reasons 
cannot compare with the constraining potential of the one school event most important for the student to 
attend.”).  Id.  See also Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 287 (1990) (“We 
have always treated with special sensitivity the Establishment Clause problems that result when 
religious observances are moved into the public schools.”); Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 
(1987) (“The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment 
Clause in elementary and secondary schools.”). 
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scope of Marsh.  As a majority of the Court started to apply the 
“reasonable observer” standard, Marsh’s rejection of such a standard 
looked more like a historical aberration instead of a general test for 
facially religious government speech.  This tension became apparent in 
Allegheny, which is the focus of the next subpart. 
B. The Rise of the Endorsement Test—Legislative Prayer Gets Stuck in 
the Marsh 
In the wake of Marsh, the Court struggled to cobble together a 
majority that could agree on the appropriate Establishment Clause test.  
The dissenters in Marsh sought to limit Marsh to legislative prayers and 
sought to apply Lemon more broadly in other contexts.  But with the 
addition of Justices Scalia and Kennedy to the Court in the 1980s, 
Lemon received greater scrutiny.71  In response to these criticisms, 
Justice O’Connor started articulating her endorsement test, most 
prominently in holiday display cases, such as Lynch v. Donnelly.72  And 
by 1989, a majority of the Court adopted her endorsement test in 
Allegheny.  But in addition to creating a new Establishment Clause test, 
Allegheny marked an important shift away from Marsh.  Whereas 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the four dissenters in Allegheny, would 
have extended Marsh to give “government some latitude in recognizing 
and accommodating the central role religion pays in our society,”73 the 
majority sought to limit Marsh to the “unique history” that justified 
nonsectarian legislative prayers.74  As a result, although Allegheny 
involved neither legislative prayers nor government speech,75 it affirmed 
 71. As has been well-documented, the Lemon test has been the object of much criticism from 
within and without the Court.  See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“I have to this 
point assumed the validity of the Lemon ‘purpose’ test.  In fact, however, I think the pessimistic 
evaluation that THE CHIEF JUSTICE made of the totality of Lemon is particularly applicable to the 
‘purpose’ prong: it is ‘a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks 
to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results . . . .’” (citation omitted)); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is not surprising . . . that our most recent 
opinions have expressed doubt on the usefulness of the Lemon test.”); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 
1803, 1819 (2010) (applying the endorsement test but expressing doubt that the “reasonable observer” 
test is appropriate for Establishment Clause review); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW §§ 14–15 (2d ed. 1988). 
 72. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a Christmas display that included 
a crèche as well as other traditional holiday symbols such as reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas 
tree, carolers, a teddy bear, and hundreds of colored lights, did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 73. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 658 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 603 (majority opinion) (“The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this 
principle because the particular chaplain ‘had removed all references to Christ.’”) (citation omitted). 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 600–01 (“On the contrary, the sign simply demonstrates that the government 
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the dissent’s view in Marsh that Marsh is a narrow exception to the 
Establishment Clause. 
In Allegheny, the Court considered whether two holiday displays—a 
crèche on the main staircase of a public courthouse and a display on a 
sidewalk comprised of a menorah, a Christmas tree, and a salute to 
liberty sign—violated the Establishment Clause.  Rejecting Marsh, a 
majority of the Court applied the endorsement test.  Unlike Marsh’s 
intent test, the endorsement test “preclude[s] government from 
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a 
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”76  The central inquiry 
under the endorsement test, therefore, is whether the government signals 
to observers that it is conveying a message of endorsement: “The effect 
of the display depends upon the message that the government’s practice 
communicates: the question is ‘what viewers may fairly understand to be 
the purpose of the display.’”77  If a reasonable observer, who is aware of 
the history and context surrounding the government action, would view 
that action as conveying a message that the government favors or 
disfavors religion generally or a particular sect over others,78 then the 
action violates the Establishment Clause.79  If the message has “the 
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’” religion over nonreligion or a specific 
faith to a hypothetical reasonable observer,80 then the government’s 
action is unconstitutional. 
Applying this test to the holiday displays in Allegheny, the Court held 
that the crèche had the “effect of promoting or endorsing religious 
beliefs” but that the Christmas tree and menorah did not.81  But, more 
is endorsing the religious message of that organization, rather than communicating a message of its 
own. . . .  Thus, by prohibiting government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits 
precisely what occurred here: the government’s lending its support to the communication of a religious 
organization’s religious message.”). 
 76. Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring)); id. at 620 (“[T]he 
constitutionality of [the display’s] effect must also be judged according to the standard of a ‘reasonable 
observer . . . .’”). 
 78. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (questioning the endorsement test but 
acknowledging that the endorsement test “requires the hypothetical construct of an objective observer 
who knows all of the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement”). 
 79. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“It is for this reason that the reasonable 
observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community 
and forum in which the religious display appears.  As I explained in Allegheny, ‘the “history and 
ubiquity” of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer 
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
 80. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989). 
 81. Id. at 621.  Justice Blackmun, however, did not take the endorsement test to supplant Lemon 
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importantly for present purposes, the Court also distinguished Marsh in 
response to Justice Kennedy’s dissent.  Contrary to the majority, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the endorsement test as “flawed in its fundamentals 
and unworkable in practice.”82  In its place, Justice Kennedy advocated 
Marsh’s historical approach: “the meaning of the [Establishment] Clause 
is to be determined by reference to historical practices and 
understandings” and “must permit not only legitimate practices two 
centuries old but also any other practices with no greater potential for an 
establishment of religion.”83  Given the history of “[g]overnment 
policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for 
religion,”84 the Establishment Clause must be understood to allow the 
government to accommodate and promote legislative prayer as well as 
other religious practices and displays, such as the crèche and menorah: 
In permitting the displays on government property of the menorah and the 
crèche, the city and county sought to do no more than “celebrate the 
season,” and to acknowledge, along with many of their citizens, the 
historical background and the religious, as well as secular, nature of the 
Chanukah and Christmas holidays.85 
Consistent with Marsh, Justice Kennedy took the government’s intent—
what it “sought to do”—to be critical when deciding whether the 
government’s accommodation of religion transgresses the Establishment 
Clause.  Because legislative prayer is consistent with the Establishment 
Clause even though it might engender “feelings of exclusion,”86 Justice 
Kennedy argued that the government can engage in a broad array of 
religious activity without violating the Establishment Clause.87 
In responding to Justice Kennedy, the majority limited Marsh in two 
primary ways.  First, the Court expressly attempted to confine Marsh’s 
historical reasoning to nonsectarian legislative prayer.  Although history 
“may affect the constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion 
by the government,” the history upon which Justice Kennedy relies 
and left open the possibility that the menorah display might violate the purpose and entanglement prongs 
of Lemon.  Id. 
 82. Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 670. 
 84. Id. at 657. 
 85. Id. at 663 (citation omitted); see also id. at 603 (majority opinion) (“Justice Kennedy, 
however, argues that Marsh legitimates all ‘practices with no greater potential for an establishment of 
religion’ than those ‘accepted traditions dating back to the Founding.’” (citations omitted)). 
 86. Id. at 673 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 665 (“If Congress and the state legislatures do not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause when they begin each day with a state-sponsored prayer for divine guidance offered by a 
chaplain whose salary is paid at government expense, I cannot comprehend how a menorah or a crèche, 
displayed in the limited context of the holiday season, can be invalid.”). 
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“cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the government’s 
allegiance to a particular sect or creed.”88  Second, the Court interpreted 
Marsh through the lens of the newly adopted endorsement test: 
Marsh itself . . . recognized that not even the “unique history” of 
legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have 
the effect of affiliating the government with any one specific faith or 
belief.  The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this 
principle because the particular chaplain had “removed all references to 
Christ.”89 
Under this view, the endorsement test’s “effect of affiliating” 
requirement sets out the general Establishment Clause rule, and Marsh is 
simply an exception to that rule.  Given its “unique history,” 
nonsectarian legislative prayers survive Establishment Clause review, 
but the majority did not even consider Marsh’s intent test. 
To limit Marsh in this manner, however, the Allegheny majority 
significantly re-characterized the reasoning in Marsh.  In fact, it 
interpreted Marsh according to a test that Marsh refused to apply.  
Recall that Justice Brennan would have struck down Nebraska’s prayer 
policy because the “invocations . . . explicitly link religious belief and 
observance to the power and prestige of the State.”90  But the “effect of 
linking” test is just the “effect of affiliating” requirement that the 
Allegheny majority applied to Marsh.  Under both tests, “the government 
[must] remain secular, rather than affiliate itself with religious beliefs or 
institutions, precisely in order to avoid discriminating among citizens on 
the basis of their religious faiths.”91 
The problem is that if the Marsh majority took this to be the proper 
test, Marsh would have been decided differently.  After all, as Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged, legislative prayer, whether nondenominational 
or not, affiliates the government with religious beliefs at some level.92  
 88. Id. at 603 (majority opinion). 
 89. Id. (citations omitted). 
 90. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 91. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610; see also id. at 612 (“And once the judgment has been made that a 
particular proclamation of Christian belief, when disseminated from a particular location on government 
property, has the effect of demonstrating the government’s endorsement of Christian faith, then it 
necessarily follows that the practice must be enjoined to protect the constitutional rights of those citizens 
who follow some creed other than Christianity.”). 
 92. Justice Kennedy expressed this concern (that the majority’s interpretation of Marsh in 
Allegheny is inconsistent with Marsh) in a slightly different way: 
  The majority suggests that our approval of legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers is 
to be distinguished from these cases on the ground that legislative prayer is nonsectarian, 
while crèches and menorahs are not.  In the first place, of course, this purported 
distinction is utterly inconsistent with the majority’s belief that the Establishment Clause 
“mean[s] no official preference even for religion over nonreligion.” 
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But Marsh does not consider the effect of the legislative prayers on third 
party listeners; rather, Marsh focuses on the government’s intent—
whether it sought to exploit the prayer opportunity to proselytize or 
advance a particular faith (a standard that is noticeably lacking from the 
Allegheny majority’s discussion of Marsh).  Thus, by explaining Marsh 
through the filter of Allegheny, Allegheny promotes the view—suggested 
by Justice Brennan at the very beginning of his Marsh dissent93—that 
Marsh is an exception to the Establishment Clause and is justified only 
because of the “unique history” of nonsectarian invocations.  And, as the 
Court has applied the endorsement test more frequently, Marsh has 
continued to be viewed as a historical aberration.  But two recent events 
have altered the status of Marsh yet again—the balance of the Court 
shifted with the additions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito and 
the Court decided Summum, which reevaluated the standard for facially 
religious government speech. 
II. MARSH, SUMMUM, AND SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
The status of legislative prayers is uncertain under Marsh and 
Allegheny.  Allegheny precludes “official preference even for religion 
over nonreligion.”94  But legislative prayers do just that.  And under 
Marsh, such prayers are constitutional.  So after Allegheny, are only 
some types of legislative prayers constitutional and, if so, which ones?  
Whereas Marsh provided a test to distinguish between constitutional and 
unconstitutional prayers, Allegheny does not.  Does Allegheny therefore 
overrule the Marsh test or simply limit Marsh to nonsectarian 
invocations? 
Without additional guidance from the Court, lower courts have 
struggled to decide how Marsh applies to the variety of prayers that have 
been used to open federal, state, and local governmental meetings.  
Because Allegheny noted that the minister in Marsh “removed all 
references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator,”95 
some lower courts interpreted Marsh to allow only nonsectarian 
legislative prayers.  But nothing in Marsh or Allegheny precludes 
sectarian invocations because such prayers were not before the Court in 
either case.  Moreover, if the government does not use the prayer 
opportunity to proselytize, promote, or disparage any specific religion, 
Id. at 665 n.4 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 673 (“If the intent of the Establishment Clause is to protect 
individuals from mere feelings of exclusion, then legislative prayer cannot escape invalidation.”). 
 93. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 94. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605. 
 95. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14. 
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then Marsh precludes a court’s parsing the content of the prayer.  As a 
result, sectarian prayers might be constitutional under Marsh.  
Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Summum provides 
courts with new guidance by clarifying the relationship between facially 
religious government speech, the Free Speech Clause, and the 
Establishment Clause.  And, in the process, Summum sets the stage for a 
broader application of Marsh in Establishment Clause cases. 
A. The Circuit Split 
Although Marsh was decided in 1983, circuit courts have only 
recently confronted the constitutional problems presented by sectarian 
legislative prayers.  As the use of legislative invocations grew, so did the 
public attention that these prayers received.  To date, however, the 
circuit courts have not come close to reaching a consensus on the 
governing Establishment Clause standard in such cases.  Drawing on 
Marsh and Allegheny, the circuits are splintered on the constitutionality 
of sectarian legislative prayer.  While the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits 
have indicated that sectarian prayer policies can survive Establishment 
Clause review, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have refused to “extend” 
Marsh to sectarian prayers.  Moreover, an en banc panel of the Fifth 
Circuit, unable to cobble together a majority to decide these questions on 
the merits, dismissed a challenge to sectarian invocations on standing 
grounds.  The Seventh Circuit followed suit, dismissing a similar action 
for lack of taxpayer standing.  As a result, these cases illustrate the 
tensions that have developed as courts try to reconcile Marsh and 
Allegheny and provide a background to better understand how 
Summum’s government speech doctrine requires courts to apply Marsh’s 
impermissible intent test when deciding Establishment Clause 
challenges to facially religious government speech.96 
 96. Three other circuits—the Second, Third, and Eighth—have mentioned Marsh in passing but 
have not yet decided a case directly dealing with legislative prayer practices.  See, e.g., Commack Self-
Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 430 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying Lemon but explaining 
that Marsh permitted Nebraska’s legislative prayer policy because it “did not confer a substantial and 
impermissible benefit on religion in general or on Christianity in particular”); Freethought Soc’y of 
Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining to apply Marsh to a Ten 
Commandments display but stating that “the Supreme Court has acknowledged the proposition that 
history can transform the effect of a religious practice”); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 
F.3d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has approved certain government activity that directly or 
indirectly recognizes the role of religion in our national life.”). 
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1. Eleventh Circuit—Marsh and Allegheny Permit Sectarian Legislative 
Prayers 
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit considered sectarian invocations in 
Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Georgia.97  The taxpayer plaintiffs in 
Pelphrey challenged the policy of starting the meetings of two 
commissions, the Cobb County Commission and the Cobb County 
Planning Commission, with a prayer.  Pursuant to long-standing 
practice, each commission allowed volunteer clergy from various 
religions and other members of the community to provide an invocation 
at the beginning of its meetings.  The clergy who offered the invocations 
represented a variety of faiths, including Christianity, Islam, Unitarian 
Universalism, and Judaism, and because neither of the commissions 
composed or censored the prayers, many of the prayers included 
sectarian references.98  In particular, “[t]he prayers have included 
references to ‘Jesus,’ ‘Allah,’ ‘God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,’ 
‘Mohammed,’ and ‘Heavenly Father.’”99  Although the commissions 
used clergy volunteers on a rotating basis, the majority of speakers were 
Christian, “reflect[ing] the composition of the religious institutions in 
Cobb County.”100 
After the commissions refused the American Civil Liberties Union’s 
request to stop allowing invocational speakers to make sectarian 
references in the opening prayers, the plaintiffs sued, asking the district 
court to find the sectarian invocations unconstitutional and to enjoin the 
practice.  Although the district court held that the Planning 
Commission’s selection process in 2003–04 violated the Establishment 
Clause, the court otherwise upheld the use of invocations at the meetings 
of both commissions.101 
 
 97. 547 F.3d 1263 (11th. Cir. 2008). 
 98. According to the panel in Pelphrey, between 1998 and 2008, “70 percent of prayers before 
the County Commission and 68 percent of prayers before the Planning Commission contained Christian 
references.”  Id. at 1267. 
 99. Id. at 1266. 
 100. Id. at 1267.  According to the plaintiffs, the vast majority—96.6%—of the clergy who gave 
invocations at the meetings were Christian, which they claimed demonstrated a violation of the 
endorsement test.  Id. 
 101. The evidence showed that in 2003–04 the Planning Commission relied on the Yellow Pages 
when selecting clergy to provide the invocation and that the deputy clerk had drawn a line through 
several categories of churches in the Yellow Pages, including “Churches-Islamic,” “Churches-Jehovah’s 
Witnesses,” “Churches-Jewish,” and “Churches-Latter Day Saints.”  Not surprisingly, then, “[n]o clergy 
from those subcategories were asked to provide the invocation during 2003–2004.”  Id. at 1267–68.  
Accordingly, the district court held that the 2003–04 selection process was unconstitutional, relying on 
Marsh’s admonition that appointment cannot “stem[] from an impermissible motive.”  Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983). 
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  Specifically, the circuit 
court held that the sectarian prayers in Pelphrey were constitutional, 
given the “unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years” 
of legislative prayer upon which the Court relied so heavily in Marsh;102 
and the Marsh majority’s insistence that “‘[t]he content of the prayer is 
not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the 
prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any 
one . . . faith or belief.’”103  Because there was no evidence that either 
commission sought to use the invocations to proselytize or promote one 
religion over another, the Eleventh Circuit declined the invitation “to 
parse the content of a particular prayer.”104  As a result, the prayers at 
commission meetings, even though frequently sectarian, did not violate 
the Establishment Clause. 
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, although the Court’s 
decisions in Allegheny and Lee v. Weisman105 “provide insight about the 
boundaries for legislative prayer,”106 they did not change the result.  In 
particular, Pelphrey took Allegheny to be consistent with “the lesson of 
Marsh that legislative prayers should not ‘demonstrate a [government] 
preference for one particular sect or creed.’”107  According to the 
Eleventh Circuit, Allegheny did not mandate that all prayers be 
nondenominational, only that they “do not ‘have the effect of affiliating 
the government with any one specific faith or belief.’”108  Lee, in turn, 
“clarified that the government ordinarily should have no role in 
determining the content of public prayers,”109 which is consistent with 
Marsh’s prohibiting judicial review of the content of such prayers absent 
evidence of an impermissible motive.110  Thus, even under Allegheny’s 
“effect of affiliating test,” the Eleventh Circuit found the prayers 
constitutional.  Because the prayers did not show that the government 
preferred one particular creed or sect over another, the court could not 
 102. Id. at 792. 
 103. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).  The dissent in Pelphrey, 
echoing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Marsh, argued that the sectarian prayers violated Lemon: “It would 
be incredulous to argue any purpose other than a religious one for ‘invoking divine guidance’ upon the 
commissions. . . .  It is equally axiomatic that the primary effect of the prayers is to advance religion.”  
Id. at 1283 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting).  Of course, Marsh rejected this line of argument, as did the 
majority in Pelphrey. 
 104. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
 105. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting school from inviting local clergy members to give 
nonsectarian prayers at public school graduations). 
 106. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270. 
 107. Id. at 1272. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1271. 
 110. Id. 
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(and did not) “‘embark on a sensitive evaluation or [] parse the content 
of a particular prayer.’”111 
2. Fifth and Seventh Circuits—No Standing, No Decision on the Merits 
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Pelphrey did not draw on a 
consensus among its sister circuits.  In fact, the other circuits that have 
heard challenges to sectarian invocations have reached widely different 
conclusions.  For example, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits issued initial 
panel opinions prohibiting sectarian prayer practices but ultimately 
dismissed the actions on standing grounds.  As a result, neither circuit 
has issued a binding precedent on the underlying Establishment Clause 
issues. 
In Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,112 the Fifth Circuit heard 
a challenge to the Tangipahoa Parish School Board’s practice of opening 
its meetings with prayer.  Although the original panel was splintered, 
with each of the three judges writing separately regarding the proper 
Establishment Clause standard, the court held in a 2–1 opinion that the 
prayer policy was unconstitutional.113  But that decision was quickly 
vacated when the court granted rehearing en banc.  In an 8–7 ruling, the 
en banc panel remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss the case for lack of taxpayer standing.114  Consequently, the 
Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of the school board’s particular 
prayer policy. 
Although following a slightly different path, the Seventh Circuit 
eventually reached the same conclusion.  In an action to stop Indiana’s 
188 year practice of beginning its legislative sessions with a prayer, the 
original panel upheld an injunction against the practice, holding that 
Marsh “hinge[d] on the nonsectarian” nature of the legislative 
prayers.115  Unlike Marsh, the invocations were not given by the same 
person; rather, clergy from different religions and some state 
representatives delivered the prayers.  In addition, many of the prayers 
contained sectarian references to Jesus, Christ, God, Almighty God, or 
Heavenly Father.116  Because the invocations included sectarian 
references, the panel denied the motion for stay pending appeal.  When 
 111. Id. at 1272 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795). 
 112. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe I), 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe II), 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 115. Hinrichs v. Bosma (Hinrichs I), 440 F.3d 393, 394–95 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 116. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly (Hinrichs II), 
506 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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the appeal of the original action was finally heard, however, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the injunction and, following the Fifth Circuit in Doe II, 
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing 
because “[t]he plaintiffs have not tied their status as taxpayers to the 
House’s allegedly unconstitutional practice of regularly offering a 
sectarian prayer.”117 
3. Sixth and Ninth Circuits—School Prayer and an Unpublished 
Decision 
Unlike the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, other circuits have reached the 
merits and issued opinions contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Pelphrey.  In particular, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have stated that 
sectarian references in legislative prayers violate the Establishment 
Clause.  These decisions are of only modest help in determining the 
constitutionality of sectarian legislative prayer, however, because neither 
circuit’s opinion addressed the issue in a manner that constitutes a 
binding precedent.  In 1987, before the Supreme Court decided 
Allegheny or Lee, the Sixth Circuit, in Stein v. Plainwell Community 
School,118 had to resolve a challenge to sectarian references at a public 
school graduation.  The court interpreted Marsh to allow only 
nonsectarian prayers.119  Of course, the Supreme Court in Lee 
subsequently distinguished prayers in public schools from those given at 
the start of legislative sessions: “[i]nherent differences between the 
public school system and a session of a state legislature distinguish this 
case from Marsh.”120  Thus, the fact that sectarian and nonsectarian 
prayers are not permitted at high school graduations does not mean that 
such prayers violate the Establishment Clause when given at the start of 
legislative meetings.  That is, given that Lee precludes all prayers at 
graduations, it is unremarkable that the Sixth Circuit found graduation 
invocations that “employ[ed] the language of Christian theology and 
prayer” unconstitutional.121 
Yet, as Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Allegheny and his opinion in 
Salazar suggest, the current Supreme Court is apt to apply Marsh more 
broadly outside the school context: “The goal of avoiding governmental 
endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the 
public realm. . . .  The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid 
 117. Id. at 599. 
 118. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 119. Id. at 1409. 
 120. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992). 
 121. Stein, F.2d at 1410. 
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any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”122  Thus, 
because the Sixth Circuit’s decision predated important Supreme Court 
cases and because the Supreme Court has subsequently distinguished 
between graduation and legislative settings, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion 
in Stein does not shed much light on the current status of sectarian 
invocations. 
Similarly, although the Ninth Circuit decided a sectarian prayer case, 
its opinion does not provide useful guidance with respect to legislative 
invocations for two reasons.  First, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bacus 
v. Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education123 is 
unpublished and, therefore, is not binding precedent under either the 
Federal Rules of Procedure or the Ninth Circuit’s local rules.124  Second, 
in Bacus, the Ninth Circuit considered sectarian prayers that were 
offered at school board meetings.  Given Marsh, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that it did not need to address whether school board 
meetings were more similar to legislative sessions or classroom prayers.  
Because the “same individual almost always offered the invocation, 
always ‘in the Name of Jesus,’ and no individuals of other religions ever 
gave the invocation[s],”125 the prayer practice advanced one faith or 
belief over others in violation of Marsh, regardless of the nature of the 
school board.  The panel, however, expressly left open the question 
“whether the prayers ‘in the Name of Jesus,’ would be a permissible 
solemnization of a legislature-like body, provided that invocations were, 
as is traditional in Congress, rotated among leaders of different faiths, 
sects, and denominations.”126  As a result, whether sectarian legislative 
prayer violates the Establishment Clause still is an open question in the 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.127 
 
 122. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010). 
 123. 52 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision). 
 124. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal 
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as 
‘unpublished,’ . . . or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) 
(“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the 
doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”). 
 125. Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 356–57. 
 126. Id. at 356. 
 127. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly (Hinrichs II), 
506 F.3d 584, 604 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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4. Fourth and Tenth Circuits—Selecting and Rejecting Invocational 
Speakers 
Although most of the circuit court cases have challenged the 
constitutionality of the prayer policies themselves, the Fourth and Tenth 
Circuits have heard claims testing the process by which invocational 
speakers are selected.  In Marsh, the repeated reappointment of the same 
Presbyterian minister did not violate the Establishment Clause absent 
proof of an “impermissible motive.”128  But is the test the same when 
the government refuses to allow someone to give an invocation?  Given 
the limited number of meetings each year, it may be impossible to give 
everyone the opportunity to lead a prayer at the start of a meeting.  But 
then how must the government choose between the different speakers? 
In Snyder v. Murray City Corp.,129 an en banc panel of the Tenth 
Circuit upheld a city council’s decision to deny a citizen’s request to 
give an invocation.130  Pursuant to its policy, the city council sent a form 
letter to local religious groups asking if they would like to give an 
opening prayer.  In response to this request, various religious leaders, 
including members of Jewish, Christian, Zen Buddhist, and Native 
American traditions, gave invocations at city council meetings.  The 
plaintiff, Tom Snyder, “draft[ed] a prayer that calls on public officials to 
cease the practice of using religion in public affairs.”131  In particular, 
Mr. Snyder’s “prayer” included the following: 
 “We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from mis-using 
the name of God in conducting government meetings; and, that you lead 
them away from the hypocritical and blasphemous deception of the 
public, attempting to make the people believe that bureaucrats’ decisions 
and actions have thy stamp of approval if prayers are offered at the 
beginning of government meetings.”132 
Viewing Marsh as a limited exception, the court noted that “the 
constitutionality of legislative prayers is a sui generis legal question.”133  
As a result, because the traditional rules did not apply, Marsh did not 
require the government to open the prayer opportunity to everyone who 
wanted to participate: “The Establishment Clause and Marsh simply do 
not require that a legislative body ensure a kind of equal public access to 
 128. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983). 
 129. 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1228. 
 132. Id. at 1228 n.3. 
 133. Id. at 1232. 
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a legislative body’s program of invocational prayers.”134  Rather, in 
permitting invocations, Marsh necessarily granted a legislative body the 
authority to select who would give the prayers, be it the same 
Presbyterian minister in Marsh or a variety of local religious leaders in 
Snyder.  Provided the method of selection did not violate the 
Constitution, the exclusion of some willing speakers created no 
Establishment Clause problem: “if Marsh allows a legislative body to 
select a speaker for its invocational prayers, then it also allows the 
legislative body to exclude other speakers.”135 
Even though courts cannot parse the content of the prayer, Marsh did 
not prevent the city council from evaluating the proposed prayer to 
insure that it did not “‘proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or 
belief.’”136  Because “all prayers ‘advance’ a particular faith or belief in 
one way or another,” the government can exclude certain “faith[s] or 
belief[s]” and permit others without violating the Establishment 
Clause.137  Provided that the overall selection process does not evince an 
improper motive, the city council can reject a prayer that “aggressively 
proselytizes for his particular religious views and strongly disparages 
other religious views.”138  Moreover, because the prayers in Marsh were 
“Judeo–Christian,” the Tenth Circuit held that the Establishment Clause 
cannot be read to prohibit any and all prayers that appeal to “particular 
concept[s] of God.”139  Thus, under the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, where 
there is no evidence that the government intended to proselytize or to 
select a speaker for an impermissible motive, sectarian legislative prayer 
would survive Establishment Clause review. 
In a series of cases, the Fourth Circuit considered challenges to both 
prayer policies and selection procedures, reaching different conclusions 
based on the facts of each case.140  In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 
South Carolina,141 the Fourth Circuit analyzed prayers at the start of city 
council meetings.142  Unlike the prayer policy in Snyder, the Town of 
 134. Id. at 1233. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1234. 
 137. Id. at 1234 n.10. 
 138. Id. at 1234 n.10, 1235. 
 139. Id. at 1234 n.10.  See also Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 
285 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A party challenging a legislative invocation practice cannot, therefore, rely on the 
mere fact that the selecting authority chose a representative of a particular faith, because some adherent 
or representative of some faith will invariably give the invocation.”). 
 140. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (“[T]he inquiry calls for line-drawing; no 
fixed, per se rule can be framed.”). 
 141. 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 142. Id. 
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Great Falls did not invite various religious leaders from the community 
to lead the prayers, relying instead on the council members themselves.  
Because the council members were Christian, the prayers frequently 
referred to “Jesus,” “Jesus Christ,” or “Savior,” and those in attendance 
customarily stood or bowed their heads during the prayers.  When the 
plaintiff, Ms. Wynne, complained about such sectarian references, the 
council did not change its policy.  Instead, council members solicited 
support for the practice from local ministers, singled Ms. Wynne out for 
failing to participate in the prayers, and refused to allow her to speak at a 
meeting even though she was listed on the agenda.143  Others in 
attendance also made Ms. Wynne feel uncomfortable and unwelcome at 
the meetings.144  Under these circumstances, the panel found that “the 
record . . . is replete with powerful ‘indication[s]’ that the Town Council 
did indeed ‘exploit’ the prayer opportunity ‘to proselytize or advance’ 
one faith.”145  In addition, interpreting Marsh through the lens of 
Allegheny, the court found the practice unconstitutional because the 
government made religion relevant to Ms. Wynne’s political standing in 
the community by “advanc[ing] its own religious views in preference to 
all others.”146  Thus, although some forms of sectarian prayer might 
survive Establishment Clause review, this particular policy did not.147 
One year later, in Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of 
Supervisors,148 the Fourth Circuit upheld a prayer policy pursuant to 
which the county invited clergy from a “wide cross-section of the 
County’s religious leaders,” including rabbis, imams, priests, pastors, 
and ministers, to provide “a wide variety of prayers” at the county 
meetings.149  Reflecting the county’s attempt to promote 
“nonsectarianism,” the prayers included “wide and embracive” sectarian 
references to “‘Lord God, our creator,’ ‘giver and sustainer of life,’ ‘the 
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob,’ ‘the God of Abraham, of Moses, 
Jesus, and Mohammad,’ ‘Heavenly Father,’ [and] ‘Lord of Lords, King 
of Kings, creator of planet Earth and the universe and our own 
 143. Id. at 295. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 298 n.4. 
 146. Id. at 302.  See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 595 (1989). 
 147. See, e.g., Wynne, 376 F.3d at 300 n.5.  But the court also suggests that Marsh might be 
limited to nonsectarian prayer by (1) distinguishing Snyder’s claim that the Establishment Clause 
prohibited only the “more aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization,” and (2) stating that 
prayers “[n]ot ‘all prayers’ ‘“advance” a particular faith.’  Rather, nonsectarian prayers, by definition, do 
not advance a particular faith.”  Id. at 301 n.6. 
 148. 404 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 149. Id. at 284–85. 
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creator.’”150  Unlike Wynne, where the “pervasively and exclusively 
sectarian” nature of the prayers “undermined . . . participation by person 
of all faiths in public life,”151 the diversity of religious speakers and 
prayers in Simpson fell within “the spacious boundaries” set forth in 
Marsh.152  Furthermore, the policy did not violate the Free Speech 
Clause because the prayers were government speech “‘subject only to 
the proscriptions of the Establishment Clause.’”153  But the county’s 
policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was “in many 
ways more inclusive than that approved by the Marsh Court” and 
because prohibiting such a policy “would push localities intent on 
avoiding litigation to select only one minister from only one faith 
[making] America and its public events more insular and sectarian rather 
than less so.”154 
Finally, in Turner v. City Council of City of Fredericksburg, 
Virginia,155 the Fourth Circuit, with Justice O’Connor sitting by 
designation and writing for the court, upheld the city’s decision to deny 
a council member’s request to offer a sectarian prayer at a city council 
meeting.156  Because the city’s prayer policy allowed only nonsectarian 
prayers, the Fourth Circuit did not have to decide whether the 
Establishment Clause might permit sectarian references under certain 
circumstances.157  Rather, the panel had to decide only whether the 
government could limit the opening invocation to nondenominational 
prayers.  The panel held that it could, given that the policy “is designed 
to make the prayers accessible to people who come from a variety of 
backgrounds, not to exclude or disparage a particular faith.”158 
The Fourth Circuit currently is considering Joyner v. Forsyth 
County,159 which asks the court to determine the constitutionally of a 
policy that permits sectarian legislative prayer.  Pursuant to its policy, 
the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners invites religious leaders 
from the community to give an invocation “according to the dictates of 
 150. Id. at 284. 
 151. Id. at 283. 
 152. Id. at 284. 
 153. Id. at 288 (quoting Rosenberger Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 820 
(1995)). 
 154. Id. at 285, 287. 
 155. 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 356 (“We need not decide whether the Establishment Clause compelled the Council 
to adopt their legislative prayer policy, because the Establishment Clause does not absolutely dictate the 
form of legislative prayer.”). 
 158. Id. at 356. 
 159. No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *2 (M.D.N.C Nov. 9, 2009). 
31
Gaylord: WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH AND SECTARIAN LEGISLAT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
G-GAYLORD 8/4/2011  2:15:21 PM 
1048 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
[each leader’s] own conscience,” provided the prayer does not 
proselytize or disparage any other faith.160  The invocations frequently 
contain references to “Jesus,” “Christ,” and “Trinity.”  Thus, the court 
will have to decide whether sectarian references violate the 
Establishment Clause.  But even under the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Marsh, Forsyth County’s policy might survive 
Establishment Clause review.  In Turner, the court invoked Marsh for 
the proposition that “courts ought not to ‘parse the content of a particular 
prayer’” if “the prayer is not used to advance a particular religion or 
disparage another faith or belief.”161  But, as Pelphrey acknowledged, 
this standard is consistent with some forms of sectarian prayer.  Where, 
as in Simpson and Pelphrey, the government invites a wide range of 
clergy to offer a wide range of prayers from their respective faith 
perspectives, such a prayer policy “recognize[s] the rich religious 
heritage of our country in a fashion that was designed to include 
members of the community, rather than to proselytize.”162 
Accordingly, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, consistent with the 
Eleventh Circuit, might allow sectarian references under Marsh, even 
though these courts have viewed Marsh as an exception rather than as 
setting out a separate Establishment Clause test.  But if Marsh now has 
the broader scope for which Justices Kennedy and Scalia argued in their 
Allegheny dissent, then sectarian prayer should fit more comfortably 
within the “spacious boundaries” of the Establishment Clause, and, as 
this Article argues below, Summum dictates just this result. 
B. Summum and the Government Speech Doctrine—Marsh Makes a 
Comeback 
To date, only two of the circuit court cases discussing legislative 
prayer have mentioned the government speech doctrine.  Both were 
decided by the Fourth Circuit, and both treated the Free Speech analysis 
as separate and distinct from the Establishment Clause review.163  In 
2009, however, the Supreme Court decided Summum v. Pleasant Grove 
City,164 in which the Court unanimously approved “the recently minted 
 160. Id. at *2. 
 161. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 909 (2009). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Turner, 534 F.3d at 354–55. 
 164. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
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government speech doctrine.”165  Pursuant to this doctrine, government 
speech is not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.166  When 
speaking, the government can “‘say what it wants’” to insure that its 
desired message is communicated.167  And because the message is its 
own, it can speak without worrying about how third parties might 
interpret that message. 
Despite being a Free Speech case, Summum directly impacts the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Although Justice Souter 
claimed that “[t]he interaction between the ‘government speech 
doctrine’ and Establishment Clause principles has not, however, begun 
to be worked out,”168 this position ignores Marsh, in which the Court 
approved legislative prayers—a specific form of facially religious 
government speech.  In Allegheny, the Court did not consider the 
standard for government speech because the town simply gave 
preferential access to a private religious speaker instead of 
communicating its own message.169  Summum, however, speaks directly 
to religious government speech and requires courts to apply Marsh’s 
intent test. 
Under Marsh, legislative prayers are constitutional unless the 
government has an “impermissible motive,” i.e., the intent to 
“proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”170  Given the government’s right to control its message, the 
constitutionality of its speech is not determined by a reasonable third 
party observer; rather, courts must determine whether the government’s 
motive was impermissibly religious.  Thus, with respect to legislative 
prayers, courts must determine whether the invocations are government 
speech or private speech so that they may decide which test—
impermissible religious purpose or endorsement—to apply to the 
legislative invocations. 
 
 165. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 166. Id. at 1131 (“The Free Speech clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it 
does not regulate government speech.”). 
 167. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 
(2000)). 
 168. Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 169. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) (“On 
the contrary, the sign simply demonstrates that the government is endorsing the religious message of that 
organization, rather than communicating a message of its own.”). 
 170. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983). 
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1. Summum and the Control Test for Government Speech 
In Summum, the Supreme Court considered whether Pleasant Grove 
City could refuse to display in a park a monument containing the Seven 
Aphorisms of the Summum religion when it already displayed a 
monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments.  In holding that the 
city could accept some facially religious monuments while rejecting 
others, the Court unanimously adopted the government speech doctrine.  
In particular, the majority held that the government “has the right ‘to 
speak for itself’” and that when speaking, the government “‘is entitled to 
say what it wishes’” and “to select the views that it wants to express.”171  
As a result, “the [g]overnment’s own speech . . . is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.”172  That is, when speaking, the government can 
discriminate based on content and viewpoint.173 
To qualify for the protection afforded by the government speech 
doctrine, the government must control the message conveyed: “In this 
case, it is clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park 
represent government speech [because] the City has ‘effectively 
controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by 
exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”174  Thus, once 
the government takes on the role of speaker, the government may claim 
the fundamental right protected by the Speech Clause—the right to 
choose the content of its message: “[T]he fundamental rule of protection 
under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to 
choose the content of his own message.”175 
Thus, for legislative prayer to fall within the government speech 
doctrine, the government must have sufficient control over the speech to 
send its own message, as opposed to simply facilitating the speech of 
private parties.176  But, under Summum, the government need not create 
 171. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (quoting Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 172. Id. (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005)). 
 173. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (stating that, 
if the government is speaking, “it may make content-based choices”); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. 
v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the government speaks for itself and is not 
regulating the speech of others, it may discriminate based on viewpoint . . . .”). 
 174. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1128 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61). 
 175. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995). 
 176. In Turner, the Fourth Circuit suggested that legislative prayers might always be government 
speech: “Turner has not cited a single case in which a legislative prayer was treated as individual or 
private speech.  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has determined that more difficult cases than this one should 
be classified as government speech.”  Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 355 
(4th Cir. 2008).  Luther and Caddell argue that, unless the government expressly endorses the prayers, 
the prayers “always should be viewed as private speech.”  Luther & Caddell, supra note 5, at 596.  Thus, 
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the invocations to qualify for the protection of the government speech 
doctrine; rather, the government can adopt the speech—i.e., the 
prayers—that third parties offer at its meetings.  As in Summum, by 
choosing only “those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose 
of presenting the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who 
frequent the Park . . . [t]he monuments that are accepted . . . are meant to 
convey and have the effect of conveying a government message.”177  
The same holds true for legislative prayers.  By engaging third parties to 
give the prayers, the government might convey one or more permissible 
messages: “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among 
the people of this country”178 or a desire to “solemniz[e] public 
occasions, express[] confidence in the future, and encourag[e] the 
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”179  But if the 
government may convey these messages through Judeo–Christian 
prayers given by a Presbyterian minister, the Establishment Clause 
should permit the government to send the same messages through a 
variety of religious leaders from the local community.  Moreover, 
provided that the government intends to send a permissible message, 
then the “content of the prayer is not of concern to judges.”180  That is, 
Marsh and Summum do not allow courts to distinguish between sectarian 
and nonsectarian prayers when the government is speaking directly or 
through third parties, absent evidence of improper intent.181 
Of course, Summum does not cite Marsh, so one might wonder 
whether there is a meaningful connection between the two cases.  After 
all, Summum concerns a Free Speech challenge to a facially religious 
monument, not an Establishment Clause challenge to government 
prayer.  But Summum directly impacts the scope of Marsh because 
Marsh also involves the intersection of the Free Speech and 
Establishment Clauses.  Just as Marsh acknowledges the special status 
of legislative prayers under the Establishment Clause, Summum 
recognizes the special status of facially religious government speech 
under the Free Exercise Clause.  And, unlike Allegheny, which sought to 
distinguish legislative prayers from other expressive activity and to limit 
not only is the distinction important to the resolution of Establishment Clause challenges to sectarian 
legislative prayers, but also it is an unsettled area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
 177. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 178. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
 179. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 180. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794. 
 181. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Johanns stands for the 
proposition that when the government determines an overarching message and retains power to approve 
every word disseminated at its behest, the message must be attributed to the government for First 
Amendment purposes.”). 
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Marsh to nonsectarian prayers in the process, Summum adopts a general 
rule that relates directly to Marsh.  Under the control test, if the 
government engages in speech activity with the intent to send its desired 
message, then the speech is government speech: “The City has selected 
those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting 
the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the 
Park.”182 
But this is precisely what the Court did in Marsh in the context of the 
Establishment Clause; it evaluated the government’s reasons for having 
prayer at the start of its meetings.  If the government intended “[t]o 
invoke Divine guidance on a public body,” such invocations are not an 
establishment but only “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely 
held among the people of this country.”183  Thus, post-Summum, if the 
government is determining the message—whether for a legislative 
prayer, a holiday display, or a monument in a public park—then, as long 
as it does not intend to proselytize or disparage, the government may 
rely on history and tradition to insulate its speech from Free Speech and 
some Establishment Clause challenges.184 
Put differently, under Marsh and Summum, there is no place for a 
“heckler’s veto” with respect to facially religious government speech.185  
Under the Free Speech Clause, third parties who do not like the 
government’s message cannot force the government either to remain 
silent or to express the third parties’ desired message: 
When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to 
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not 
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines 
of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.  Petitioners’ 
assertions ultimately boil down to the position that if the Government 
chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous 
counterpart rights.  But the Court has soundly rejected that proposition.186 
Marsh and Summum hold that the same is true under the Establishment 
Clause.  When the government engages in legislative prayer, those who 
disagree with the message cannot force the government to be silent or to 
change its message, no matter how sincere their concerns: “We do not 
 182. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
 183. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
 184. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–87 (2005) (plurality opinion) (stating that 
the Court’s permitting of the Ten Commandments monument on state grounds was “driven both by the 
nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history” and that “[w]e have acknowledged . . . that 
‘religion has been closely identified with our history and government’ . . . .”). 
 185. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 186. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (citation omitted). 
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doubt the sincerity of those, who like respondent, believe that to have 
prayer in this context risks the beginning of the establishment the 
Founding Fathers feared.  But this concern is not well founded.”187 
Accordingly, despite third party objections, in Summum, the city 
could accept and display only those monuments that reflected its chosen 
message regarding the history of the community, and in Marsh, the 
Nebraska legislature could continue participating in the “unambiguous 
and unbroken history of more than 200 years” of legislative prayer.188  
The city, as speaker, was not required to accept monuments from all 
donors and could communicate the message that it wanted to send 
through the selection of its monuments, including a monument inscribed 
with the Ten Commandments.  Similarly, legislatures or other 
deliberative bodies are not required to allow all invocational speakers to 
deliver an opening prayer and can craft a prayer policy permitting 
sectarian or nonsectarian prayer provided that the policy does not stem 
from an impermissible motive.  That is, the government may engage in a 
broader array of government speech without violating the Establishment 
Clause.  And, if this is correct, then Marsh now has the broader 
application for which Justices Kennedy and Scalia argued for in dissent 
in Allegheny.  That is, post-Summum, the exception has become the rule. 
2. Marsh and Summum Preclude Application of the Endorsement Test to 
Legislative Prayers 
In his Summum concurrence, Justice Souter proposed a “reasonable 
observer” test for facially religious government speech.  According to 
Justice Souter, this test would mirror the endorsement test to provide 
“coherence within Establishment Clause law”189 and would require 
courts to determine “whether a reasonable and fully informed observer 
would understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct 
from private speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the 
monument to be placed on public land.”190  Justice Souter’s reliance on 
the endorsement test is misplaced, however, because it focuses on the 
wrong person in the communicative process—the observer—instead of 
the speaker.  Rather than analyze what is critical in the government 
speech context—the government’s intent—the endorsement test 
considers the effect of the message on a reasonable observer who is 
aware of the history and context. 
 187. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
 188. Id. at 792. 
 189. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 190. Id. 
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But the government’s reasons for engaging in the speech (e.g., 
solemnizing an event or participating in the long-standing tradition of 
legislative prayer) may differ significantly from how others interpret that 
message.  That is, even though the government controls the content of its 
speech, it cannot control how others interpret a monument or other form 
of government speech.  After all, government speech, such as the 
monument in Summum, is not limited to “convey[ing] only one 
‘message.’”191  Those who hear the government’s message may interpret 
that message in various ways: “[e]ven when a monument features the 
written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may 
in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways.”192  
Yet the fact that third parties might ascribe different meanings to the 
government’s speech does not change the fact that the government 
intended a specific message: “[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a 
single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and 
consequently, the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government 
entity that accepts and displays such an object may be quite different 
from those of either its creator or its donor.”193 
Contrary to Justice Souter, then, the “reasonable observer” test does 
not apply to facially religious government speech.  Under the 
government speech doctrine, the government has the right to say what it 
wants.  Under Marsh, the government can “want” to engage in 
legislative prayer provided it does not have an improper motive.  Thus, 
as in Marsh, a court’s Establishment Clause analysis must focus on the 
government’s intent when dealing with facially religious government 
speech.  In fact, if a court requires the government to convey only those 
messages that a reasonable observer would view as neutral towards 
religion, the government loses the “right to ‘speak for itself.’”194  Instead 
of “say[ing] what it wishes,” the government is forced to filter its speech 
to account for how the reasonable observer might interpret the 
government’s message—even though, as Summum suggested, such an 
observer may interpret the message differently from how the 
government intended. 
Put differently, the endorsement test presupposes a premise that 
Summum and Marsh reject—that the government’s message can be 
 191. Id. at 1135; Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (“But a Latin cross is not merely 
a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs.  It is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic 
acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and 
its people.”). 
 192. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135. 
 193. Id. at 1136. 
 194. Id. at 1131. 
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determined by the meaning that others attribute to the government, i.e., 
as Allegheny put it, the “effect of the crèche [or other religious display] 
on those who viewed it,”195 or as the district court in Joyner stated, “the 
effect of affiliating the Government with that particular faith or 
belief.”196  The government speech doctrine, however, is not predicated 
on the “effect” of the government’s speech on others regardless of the 
religious/secular or sectarian/nonsectarian nature of that speech.  
Because the government is no longer merely facilitating speech but, 
instead, engaging in it, the operative question shifts from who is 
speaking—private party or the government—to what message the 
government intended to convey: 
 If there is to be assurance that the Establishment Clause retains its 
force in guarding against those governmental actions it was intended to 
prohibit, we must in each case inquire first into the purpose and object of 
the governmental action in question and then into the practical details of 
the program’s operation.197 
The investigation into the “purpose and object” of facially religious 
government speech, however, is just an inquiry into the government’s 
intent in engaging in the speech.  Where, as in Marsh, the government 
does not attempt to exploit the prayer opportunity, the court does not 
concern itself with the content of the prayer.  Similarly, if the 
government selects invocational speakers without attempting to advance 
one faith, there is no Establishment Clause violation: “Absent proof that 
the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an impermissible motive, 
we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself conflict with the 
Establishment Clause.”198 
Thus, under Marsh and Summum, the focus is not on what a prayer or 
monument might mean to a third party observer, but on the 
government’s reasons for approving the prayer policy or monument in 
the first instance.  And while the endorsement test is not well suited for 
determining the intent of the government actor, Marsh’s “impermissible 
intent” test is.  Thus, when speaking, the government violates the 
Establishment Clause not simply by engaging in facially religious 
speech but by engaging in such speech for the purpose of promoting or 
advancing religion: “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause 
is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
 195. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 599 (1989). 
 196. Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 
2009). 
 197. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 838–39 (1995). 
 198. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983). 
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another.”199  Given the long-standing history of legislative invocations, 
such facially religious speech violates the Establishment Clause only 
when the government expressly exploits “the prayer opportunity to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”200 
Of course, to survive Establishment Clause review, the government’s 
proposed reason must “be sincere and not a sham.”201  Thus, if a town 
council, as in Wynne, uses legislative prayer “to advance its own 
religious view in preference to all others” by excluding a member of the 
community from the political process and soliciting support for its 
specific sectarian practices from like-minded religious leaders,202 the 
town council cannot seek refuge in Marsh.  But, as Marsh expressly 
states, if the government does not use legislative prayer to promote or 
disparage any particular faith, then the Establishment Clause is not 
implicated, and absent a showing of impermissible intent, the courts will 
not “parse the content of a particular prayer.”203 
Post-Summum, courts cannot simply rely on the facially religious 
nature of the speech—i.e., what “the public ‘sees and hears’”204—when 
resolving an Establishment Clause challenge because the government’s 
reasons for engaging in speech (e.g., solemnizing legislative meetings in 
Marsh or celebrating local history in Summum) may differ significantly 
from the purpose that an observer ascribes to the government.  But, 
given that Marsh’s impermissible intent test focuses on whether the 
government’s actual purpose is to proselytize or disparage a particular 
religion, the Marsh test is also consistent with the distinguishing feature 
of the government speech doctrine—the government’s right to determine 
its own message within the two hundred year history of legislative 
prayer. 
 199. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).  Under this view, the government must be 
“non-preferential.”  That is, although the government is allowed to favor religion over non-religion, it 
cannot discriminate in favor of or against particular religions.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]here is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally . . . .”); Salazar v. Buono, 
130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818–19 (2010) (“The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public 
acknowledgment of religion’s role in society. . . .  Rather, it leaves room to accommodate divergent 
values within a constitutionally permissible framework.”).  But see Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and 
Moments of Silence: The Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 200. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95. 
 201. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987). 
 202. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 203. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
 204. Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 
2009) (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 282 (2005)). 
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III. SECTARIAN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER UNDER MARSH AND SUMMUM 
Although Marsh holds that the Founders did not “intend[] the 
Establishment Clause of the [First] Amendment to forbid” legislative 
prayers,205 it does not expressly reference sectarian invocations.  Thus, 
even if Nebraska’s prayer policy is wholly consistent with “the 
interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen who saw no real threat 
to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to 
that now challenged,”206 a policy that allows sectarian references may 
not be similarly consistent.  But, given that Marsh does not permit 
courts to focus initially on the content of the prayer, it might permit 
some form of sectarian prayer.  That is, under Marsh and Summum, the 
sectarian or nonsectarian nature of the prayer is initially irrelevant to the 
Establishment Clause analysis unless there is evidence that the 
government had an impermissible motive: “[t]he content of the prayer is 
not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication” that the 
government intended to exploit the prayer opportunity.207 
Of course, if the same Presbyterian minister made sectarian references 
to the same Presbyterian deity for sixteen years, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis might have been different.  Such continuing reliance on one 
religious leader from one denomination to make sectarian references to 
one deity might provide evidence that the Nebraska legislature was 
discriminating in its selection procedure, proselytizing, or attempting to 
advance that particular Christian sect.  But the Marsh Court did not 
preclude any and all sectarian references because to do so would have 
been inconsistent with the long-standing history and tradition upon 
which to Court relied.208  As the Court stated in Van Orden v. Perry: 
 205. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790. 
 206. Id. at 791. 
 207. Id. at 794.  Luther and Caddell rely on the same language from Marsh but do not believe this 
language is compatible with the government speech doctrine.  Luther & Caddell, supra note 5, at 596–
97 (“[T]his [government speech] doctrine must be reconsidered or else other manifestations of speech, 
including but not limited to religious speech, are likely to become strangers to the public square.”).  
There are at least two reasons that their argument is not persuasive.  First, subsequent to their article, the 
Court decided Summum, in which the Court provided its most detailed analysis of the government 
speech doctrine and which alters the Establishment Clause analysis.  Second, Luther and Caddell’s claim 
that “the prayer itself . . . always should be viewed as private speech protected by the Free Exercise and 
Free Speech Clauses” seems inconsistent with Marsh and Summum.  Id. at 596.  Given that the minister 
in Marsh was employed and paid by the Nebraska, there is good reason to view his legislative prayers as 
government speech, which the Court held to be constitutional.  Moreover, other prayer practices might 
be government speech even if Marsh is not and, provided they do not proselytize or disparage, could 
survive Establishment Clause review. 
 208. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“As its history 
abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly 
neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from 
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“Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent 
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.”209  Yet if Marsh and Summum allow for sectarian legislative 
prayer in certain circumstances, it is important to consider when such 
sectarian references are constitutional.  The remainder of this Article 
focuses on that consideration. 
A. A Model Prayer Policy 
As with most Establishment Clause claims, the constitutionality of a 
particular sectarian invocation is fact dependent: “Establishment Clause 
challenges are not decided by bright-line rules, but on a case-by-case 
basis with the result turning on the specific facts.”210  Given the myriad 
of ways that federal, state, and local governments might engage in 
legislative prayer—from formal policies to spontaneous prayers at the 
beginning of some meetings—there is no way to evaluate all possible 
variations of sectarian invocations.  Thus, to begin analyzing the 
constitutionality of sectarian legislative prayer under Marsh and 
Summum, this subpart proposes a model policy, some form of which has 
been used by legislatures and other deliberative bodies across the 
country.211  Drawing on Supreme Court precedent, the model policy 
incorporates the general features of legislative prayer that courts have 
pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.”); Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he mere fact a prayer evokes a particular concept 
of God is not enough to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.  Rather, what is prohibited by the clause 
is a more aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization.”) (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95). 
 209. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005); see also id. at 690 n.8 (2005) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., plurality) (“In Marsh, the prayers were often explicitly Christian . . . .”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 818 
n.38 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that several state legislatures engaged in overtly sectarian 
legislative prayers); Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 285 n.23 (D.D.C. 2005) (recognizing that 
“the legislative prayers at the U.S. Congress are overtly sectarian”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 
312 (1952) (“The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a 
separation of Church and State. . . .  Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—
hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. . . .  Prayers in our legislative halls . . . and all other references 
to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First 
Amendment.”). 
 210. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
678 (1984) (“[T]he inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed.”). 
 211. The policy set forth is similar to the Forsyth County, North Carolina policy that currently is 
pending before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Thus, this Part considers the Establishment Clause 
question in the context of an ongoing controversy.  It also embodies some general features that the Court 
and some commentators have taken to be important for sectarian legislative prayer under the 
Establishment Clause—even though they might have applied the improper test.  See, e.g., Delahunty, 
supra note 5, at 565 (“The bedrock claim here is that by giving expression to the diversity of the state 
population’s religious views by means of some such selection procedure, the legislature can insure that 
no unconstitutional preference or endorsement arises.”). 
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previously upheld to determine whether sectarian references under such 
a policy would survive Establishment Clause review.  Consider the 
following model policy: 
1. The purpose of this policy is to solemnize the proceedings of the 
government entity by allowing an invocation or prayer to be 
offered at the start of its meetings.212 
2. No person in attendance at any such meeting shall be required to 
participate in any invocation or prayer that is offered.213 
3. The invocation or prayer shall be given by a volunteer who is a 
religious leader or clergy member of a religious group with an 
established presence in the local community.214 
a.  The government entity shall compile a list of the religious 
institutions with an established presence in the local community 
from: (i) the annual Yellow Pages phone book entries for 
“churches,” “congregations,” or “other religious assemblies;” 
and (ii) requests from specific religious groups asking to be 
included in the list.  The government entity shall update the list 
on or about November 1 of each calendar year.215 
b.  On or about December 1 of each calendar year, the government 
entity shall mail an invitation to the “religious leader” of each 
congregation or religious group on the government entity’s list, 
referenced in paragraph 3(a) above.216 
c.  Individuals responding to the invitation shall be scheduled on a 
first-come, first-serve basis to give an invocation or prayer at a 
meeting during the next calendar year.217 
 212. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Those government acknowledgments of 
religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of 
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of 
what is worthy of appreciation in society.  For that reason, and because of their history and ubiquity, 
those practices are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs.”). 
 213. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (“Here, the individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult, 
presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination,’ . . . or peer pressure . . . .”). 
 214. Id. at 792 (“To invoke divine guidance on a public body . . . is not, in these circumstances, 
and ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment 
of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.”).  The “established presence” requirement 
tracks the Court’s analysis in ballot access cases, where candidates must have a “significant modicum of 
support.”  See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 
767, 782–83 (1974).  Moreover, this requirement recognizes that there should be no Establishment 
Clause problem if the government does not invite an individual who claims to represent a religion of one 
because such an idiosyncratic religious belief would not be a part of “beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country.”  Id. 
 215. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 216. There is nothing magical about the specific dates given in the model policy.  The key is that 
the government adheres to a set schedule to promote uniformity and to insure a consistent application of 
the policy. 
 217. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Indeed, 
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4. No person who gives an invocation or prayer shall be compensated 
for his or her service.218 
5. The government entity shall take reasonable steps to ensure that a 
variety of eligible invocational speakers are given the opportunity 
to provide the invocation or prayer at the government entity’s 
meetings, but no invocational speaker shall be scheduled to give 
the prayer or invocation at consecutive meetings or at more than 
two meetings during any calendar year.219 
6. The government entity shall not engage in any prior review of or 
inquiry about the content of the prayer that any invocational 
speaker might offer. 
7. Prior to the start of the meeting, someone from the government 
entity shall introduce the invocational speaker and invite those who 
wish to do so to stand for the invocation or prayer.220 
8. By opening the prayer opportunity to all religious groups in the 
community, the government entity intends to acknowledge and 
express its respect for the diversity of religious denominations and 
faiths represented and practiced among the members of the local 
community.221 
Under this model policy, sectarian prayer is not only possible but also 
probable.  Because the government does not review the content of the 
prayer before the meeting, invocational speakers may make specific 
the selection aspect of the practice here is in many ways more inclusive than that approved by the Marsh 
Court. . . .  In contrast to Marsh’s single Presbyterian clergyman, the County welcomes rabbis, imams, 
priests, pastors, and ministers.  Chesterfield not only sought but achieved diversity.  Its first-come, first-
serve system led to prayers being given by a wide cross-section of the County’s religious leaders.”). 
 218. If there is no Establishment Clause violation when the government pays a chaplain, as in 
Marsh, there should not be a violation when the religious leaders are not compensated for giving the 
invocation.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794 (“Nor is the compensation of the chaplain from public funds a 
reason to invalidate the Nebraska Legislature’s chaplaincy; remuneration is grounded in historic 
practice . . . .”); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 285 (“Indeed, the selection aspect of the practice here is in many 
ways more inclusive than that approved by the Marsh Court.  Ministers in Chesterfield, unlike in Marsh, 
are not paid with public funds.”). 
 219. If the same chaplain could give the invocation for sixteen consecutive years, there should be 
no Establishment Clause violation when the same clergy member gives an invocation twice during the 
same year.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94 (“Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from 
an impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself conflict with the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 220. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (“The influence and force of a formal exercise in 
a school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise we condoned in Marsh.  The Marsh majority 
in fact gave specific recognition to this distinction and placed particular reliance on it in upholding the 
prayers at issue there.”). 
 221. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 286 (“Chesterfield has likewise made plain that it was not affiliated 
with any one specific faith by opening its doors to a very wide pool of clergy.”); Pelphrey v. Cobb 
County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (“This diversity of speakers, in contrast with the chaplain 
of one denomination allowed in Marsh, supports the finding that the County did not exploit the prayers 
to advance any one religion.”). 
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references to their specific deities, thereby giving rise to sectarian 
legislative prayer.  The model policy does not, by itself, determine the 
difficult question of who is speaking—the government or the 
invocational speaker: “[t]here may be situations in which it is difficult to 
tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is 
providing a forum for private speech.”222  But, under Summum, this is a 
threshold question given that the nature of the speaker dictates the 
appropriate Establishment Clause test.  Accordingly, the next subpart 
attempts to do just this—consider who is speaking under the model 
policy and decide whether sectarian invocations by each type of speaker 
would survive Establishment Clause review. 
B. Applying the Model Policy—Government Speech v. Private Speech 
Because different Establishment Clause rules apply to different types 
of speakers, courts must determine who is speaking before evaluating 
the government’s prayer policy.  If the government is speaking, then 
Marsh’s intent test governs, but if the government has created a forum 
for private invocations, then the endorsement test applies.  But which is 
it?  Under the model policy, the government invites the leaders of all 
religious organizations in the community but imposes no restrictions 
(except perhaps precluding any proselytizing or disparaging references 
to other religions) on the prayers that the speakers can give.  Does this 
constitute government speech?  Is the government sending a message 
through each prayer or through the policy as a whole?  Has the 
government simply adopted the speech of others to convey a message 
about the diversity of religious traditions in the community while 
solemnizing its meetings?  Or has the government created a forum for 
legislative prayer?  If the latter, can the government exclude certain 
speakers or certain types of prayers?  If so, under what circumstances?  
To begin answering these difficult Free Speech Clause and 
Establishment Clause questions, it is useful to consider: (1) what 
features of the model policy suggest government or private speech; and 
(2) how the respective Establishment Clause tests apply to sectarian 
prayers given by each type of speaker. 
1. Sectarian Legislative Prayer as Government Speech 
The government speech doctrine seems to create two immediate 
Establishment Clause problems when applied to sectarian legislative 
 222. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009). 
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prayers.  First, if the government has effective control over speech that 
contains sectarian references, then the government seems to be 
endorsing one religion or sect over others in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  By invoking the guidance or blessings of 
“Jesus,” “Yahweh,” or “Allah” as part of its opening prayer, the 
government suggests to others that it favors a specific religion.223  
Second, government sectarian prayer might contravene the 
Establishment Clause principle set out in Lee: “[i]t is a cornerstone 
principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that ‘it is no part of 
the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of 
the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on 
by government.’”224  Thus, at first glance, it might appear that the 
government speech doctrine makes the Establishment Clause problems 
worse, not better. 
But, as Marsh demonstrates, legislative prayers—whether sectarian or 
nonsectarian—do not automatically violate the Establishment Clause.  
Courts can determine the type of prayer only by looking at the language 
used in a specific prayer.  Yet, under Marsh, courts cannot inquire about 
the content of the prayers unless the government has exploited the 
prayer opportunity.  Thus, the constitutionality of legislative prayer 
cannot hinge on an a priori classification of the prayers as sectarian or 
nonsectarian.  That is, because Marsh prohibits courts from parsing the 
language of invocations, the government as speaker can permit sectarian 
invocations provided it does not have an impermissible motive.  If, as 
under the model policy, the government’s intent is to solemnize its 
meetings and to acknowledge the diverse religious traditions in the 
community, then there is no basis for the courts to look into or parse the 
content of the prayers.  Under these circumstances, the distinction 
between sectarian and nonsectarian prayers falls away. 
Furthermore, if the government is speaking, legislative prayer does 
not implicate the threat the Court identifies in Lee because the 
government is not composing an official prayer for others to recite.  
Instead, the government is either giving the prayer itself or “enlist[ing] 
private entities to convey its own message.”225  If the former, then the 
repeated use of the same sectarian references could, as in Wynne, give 
rise to an Establishment Clause violation.  Having government officials 
give the same prayers from the same faith perspective could demonstrate 
the government’s intent to proselytize or advance a particular faith.  But 
even this does not give rise to an automatic Establishment Clause 
 223. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005). 
 224. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)). 
 225. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
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violation.  After all, Nebraska retained the same Presbyterian minister, 
who gave the same type of sectarian and Judeo–Christian prayers over a 
sixteen year period, without violating the Establishment Clause. 
Moreover, if the government adopts the speech of others as its own, 
legislative prayers given by third parties still could be government 
speech: “Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection 
require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in 
the communication.”226  Under Summum and Hurley, the government 
can assemble various religious leaders to convey its message through the 
opening prayers: “But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional 
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit 
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter 
of the speech.”227  And this is true regardless of how third parties 
interpret the prayer policy: “Indeed, this general rule[’s] . . . point is 
simply the point of all speech protection, which is to shield just those 
choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even 
hurtful.”228  By adopting a formal prayer policy, the government entity 
controls both the types of prayer permitted as well as the speakers who 
are eligible to deliver them.  By allowing established religious groups in 
the area to offer prayers from their specific faith traditions, the 
government controls the legislative prayers and combines the 
“multifarious [religious] voices” to convey its desired message.229 
Furthermore, if the government is speaking, it presumably could 
request or even require invocational speakers to avoid proselytizing or 
disparaging other religions.  Such a request would be consistent with the 
government having control over the speech: 
Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expressive units of the 
parade from potential participants, and though the score may not produce 
 226. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 570 
(1995).  In Hurley, the parade organizers did not create or dictate the specific content of each group 
marching in the parade.  Id. at 569.  Yet the organizers did not lose the protection of the First 
Amendment simply because they assembled various groups that, when combined, did not convey only 
one specific message.  Id. at 569–70.  In fact, the First Amendment expressly protected their right to 
determine which groups would be allowed to march in the parade.  Id. at 574 (“Rather like a composer, 
the Council selects the expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score 
may not produce a particularized message, each contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports 
with what merits celebration on that day.”). 
 227. Id. at 569–70. 
 228. Id. at 573–74. 
 229. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The 
context, and to a degree, the content of the invocation segment is governed by established guidelines by 
which the Board may regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it ‘enlists private entities 
to convey its own message.’” (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 292 F. Supp. 2d 
805, 819 (E.D. Va. 2003))). 
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a particularized message, each contingent’s expression in the Council’s 
eyes comports with what merits celebration . . . .  [T]he Council clearly 
decided to exclude a message it did not like from the communication it 
chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker 
to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent 
on another.230 
As a speaker, the government has the right to exclude messages it does 
not like, such as “proselytization” or “disparagement,” especially when 
Marsh expressly precludes the government from exploiting the prayer 
opportunity for these purposes.  In requesting that speakers avoid such 
invocations, the government would be demonstrating that its intent 
conforms to Establishment Clause requirements: “[t]he Marsh Court’s 
focus was—as ours should be—not on the content of the prayer but on 
the practices and motivations behind the prayer opportunity.”231  As a 
result, by requiring speakers to conform with Marsh, the government 
would be conforming its message to the Establishment Clause, not 
violating it. 
In addition, the fact that the government might adopt the prayer policy 
to convey a particular message while a particular invocational speaker 
might give the prayer to promote her particular faith does not by itself 
violate the Establishment Clause: 
[A] painting of a religious scene may have been commissioned and 
painted to express religious thoughts and feelings.  Even if the painting is 
donated to the museum by a patron who shares those thoughts and 
feelings, it does not follow that the museum, by displaying the painting, 
intends to convey or is perceived as conveying the same “message.”232 
Under Summum, the government can allow a religious leader to refer to 
“Jesus,” “Yahweh,” “Allah,” or some other deity without intending to 
adopt or promote that leader’s particular faith.  Under Marsh, Summum, 
and Salazar, the fact that the public “sees and hears” facially religious 
speech233—be it legislative prayers, a monument inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments, or a solitary Roman cross on Sunrise Rock—is not 
 230. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574. 
 231. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Doe I), 473 F.3d 188, 212 (5th Cir. 2006) (Clement, J., 
dissenting).  See also Stein v. Plainwell Cmty. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406, 1416 n.9 (6th Cir. 1987) (Wellford, 
J., dissenting) (“That these [congressional sectarian] invocations pass constitutional muster according to 
Marsh indicates, it seems to me, a critical flaw in the majority’s analysis.  The mention of the Deity, 
even in the Christian context, in the invocation and benediction at issue, are not of critical import as 
indicated in the constitutional practices of the Senate chaplain.”). 
 232. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 n.5 (2009). 
 233. See, e.g., Joyner v. Forsyth County, No. 1:07CV243, 2009 WL 3787754, at *8 (M.D.N.C. 
Nov. 9, 2009) (“Critically, it is the prayers themselves that the public ‘sees and hears,’ not the selection 
policy.”). 
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dispositive.  Instead of analyzing how third parties might interpret the 
government’s message, courts must consider the government’s intent.  
Thus, because the government’s intended message is controlling,234 the 
model policy can permit sectarian references by religious leaders of 
different faiths without contravening Establishment Clause principles. 
Under the government speech doctrine, then, the government can 
claim the speech of third parties as its own, even if it sets only the 
general parameters of the policy and not the specific content of the 
prayers.  For example, in Marsh, the Nebraska legislature did not control 
the specific content of the minister’s prayers, which remained “Judeo–
Christian” even after the minister removed specific references to 
“Christ.”235  But the legislative prayers still were government speech 
and still did not violate the Establishment Clause.  Similarly, under 
Marsh and Summum, government officials can allow religious leaders 
from diverse faiths to make sectarian references in the invocation to 
convey their desired me
Government decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what they 
view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account such 
content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture.  The 
monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the 
effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute 
government speech.236 
There are two important corollaries to the government’s right to select 
religious speakers.  First, given the government’s control over its 
message, it also must have the right to exclude other would-be speakers, 
such as atheists and agnostics, without infringing the Establishment 
Clause.  That is, because Marsh permits the government to advance 
religion over nonreligion by allowing prayer at the beginning of its 
meetings,237 the government must be able to exclude nonreligious or 
anti-religious speakers under the model policy.238  Otherwise, a third 
party could demand the right to speak at the opening of a meeting, 
 234. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 (“Contrary to respondent’s apparent belief, it frequently is not 
possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and consequently, the 
thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government entity that accepts and displays such an object may 
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”). 
 235. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983). 
 236. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
 237. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 673 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If the intent of the Establishment Clause is to protect individuals from 
mere feelings of exclusion, then legislative prayer cannot escape invalidation.”). 
 238. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘impermissible 
motive’ standard does not require that all faiths be allowed the opportunity to pray.  The standard instead 
prohibits purposeful discrimination.”). 
49
Gaylord: WHEN THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE: MARSH AND SECTARIAN LEGISLAT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
G-GAYLORD 8/4/2011  2:15:21 PM 
1066 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
forcing the government as speaker to relinquish the protection afforded 
by the First Amendment: “Under this approach any contingent of 
protected individuals with a message would have the right to participate 
in [the organizers’] speech [which would] violate[] the fundamental rule 
of protection under the First Amendment that a speaker has the 
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”239  Thus, Marsh 
and Summum permit the government to limit the prayer policy to 
religious groups with an established presence in the community. 
Second, the model policy is not unconstitutional simply because 
representatives from one faith repeatedly give the invocation.  Under the 
model policy, a particular leader from a specific congregation can give 
an invocation at most twice during the year, but there is no limit on how 
many times individuals who are Methodist, Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, or 
some other faith can lead the prayers.  The policy depends on volunteers 
who sign-up on a first-come, first-serve basis.  If one faith constitutes 
the largest denomination in a community and many religious leaders of 
that same denomination volunteer, it is unremarkable that the majority 
of speakers would be from that one faith.  But, as Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris explains in the context of school vouchers, the religious make-up 
of the community does not automatically violate Establishment Clause 
principles: 
It is true that 82% of Cleveland’s participating private schools are 
religious schools, but it is also true that 81% of private schools in Ohio 
are religious schools.  To attribute constitutional significance to this 
figure, moreover, would lead to the absurd result that . . . an identical 
private choice program might be constitutional in some States, such as 
Maine or Utah, where less than 45% of private schools are religious 
schools, but not in other States, such as Nebraska or Kansas, where over 
90% of private schools are religious schools.240 
Unlike the school choice program in Zelman, which was “entirely 
neutral with respect to religion,”241 a legislative prayer policy is not.  
But Marsh established that the lack of “neutrality” between religion and 
nonreligion with respect to legislative invocations is wholly consistent 
with the Establishment Clause, i.e., that the Founders did not intend the 
Establishment Clause to preclude legislative prayer.  Hence, provided 
that the selection process is neutral, any disparity in the percentages of 
particular faiths that participate in the prayer policy violates the 
Establishment Clause only if the “reappointment stemmed from an 
 239. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 
(1995). 
 240. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 657 (2002). 
 241. Id. at 662. 
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impermissible motive.”242 
Under the model prayer policy, however, there is no basis to ascribe 
an impermissible intent to the government.  The policy is designed to 
show the government’s “commitment to participation by persons of all 
faiths in public life.”243  Even though the government’s speech might 
contain sectarian references, the model policy is open to all faiths on 
equal terms and, as a result, it is more inclusive than the policy upheld in 
Marsh244 and it avoids the problem of having the government analyze 
the terms of each prayer to determine whether it is “too sectarian,” i.e., it 
enables the government to stay out of the business of regulating and 
approving the content of the legislative prayers.  Accordingly, if the 
legislative invocations are government speech, then, absent evidence of 
the government’s exploiting the prayer opportunity to proselytize or 
disparage, sectarian and nonsectarian prayers should pass Establishment 
Clause review. 
2. Sectarian Legislative Prayers as Private Speech 
If the government is not speaking through the opening prayers, then 
the invocation givers must be the speakers for First Amendment 
purposes.  That is, if the government lacks the requisite control over the 
prayers, then it must have created a “prayer forum” at the start of its 
meetings by opening the prayer opportunity to the leaders of the various 
religions in the community.245  As a result, given that legislative prayers 
implicate both the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, the 
government must satisfy both the forum rules imposed by the Free 
 242. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983).  Just as the Cleveland officials did not 
create the disparity in parochial and secular private schools in Zelman, government officials do not 
control the religious demographics of the community.  By opening the prayer opportunity to all faiths in 
the community, the government shows respect for all religions and allows for “a wide cross-section of 
the County’s religious leaders” to participate.  Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 
276, 285 (4th Cir. 2005).  The fact that some religious groups may not want to participate or that some 
denominations provide the prayer on more than one occasion does not change the analysis. 
 243. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 283. 
 244. See, e.g., Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1274 (“The taxpayers would have us parse legislative prayers 
for sectarian references even when the practice of legislative prayers has been far more inclusive than 
the practice upheld in Marsh.  We decline this role of ‘ecclesiastical arbiter,’ . . . for it ‘would achieve a 
particularly perverse result . . . .’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 245. In Summum, the Court recognized that the same could happen in relation to permanent 
monuments: 
  To be sure, there are limited circumstances in which the forum doctrine might 
properly be applied to a permanent monument—for example, if a town created a 
monument on which all of its residents (or all those meeting some other criterion) could 
place the name of a person to be honored or some other private message. 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009). 
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Speech Clause and the anti-establishment concerns protected by the 
Establishment Clause.  The government’s ability to preclude particular 
speakers depends on the specific type of forum created—designated 
open, designated limited, or nonpublic.246  No longer having effective 
control over the message to qualify for protection under the government 
speech doctrine, the government loses its ability to make content-based 
and viewpoint-based distinctions.  Instead, at a minimum, the 
government restrictions on the forum must be reasonable and viewpoint 
neutral.247  Moreover, under the Establishment Clause, because the 
government opened its meetings to third party speech, the government 
must remain neutral between and among the speakers who use the 
forum, which is a hallmark of the endorsement test.248  That is, if the 
government is not speaking, then the government cannot regulate in a 
way that sends a message that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
favoring one religious sect over another. 
With respect to the free speech analysis, the government’s permitting 
legislative invocations appears reasonable in light of Marsh’s approving 
the two hundred year history of such prayers.  Furthermore, legislative 
prayers may, as Justice O’Connor acknowledged, serve the secular 
purposes of “solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the 
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of 
appreciation in society.”249  Such purposes are served by prayers that the 
government controls as well as by those that third parties offer in a 
forum created by the government.  Thus, given the long-standing history 
and the secular justifications for such practices, it is reasonable for the 
government to permit legislative prayer.  But could the government limit 
the speakers or the types of prayers in such a forum?  If the government 
opens up the forum at all, “must [it] relinquish its power to exclude 
 246. Legislative prayers at the start of government meetings are not a traditional open forum 
because such meetings are not “streets and parks[,] which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’”  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 247. Id. at 46 (“Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public 
communication is governed by different standards. . . .  In addition to time, place, and manner 
regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as 
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 
788, 806 (1985) (stating that restrictions imposed on access to a nonpublic forum must be “reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum and [be] viewpoint neutral”). 
 248. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (“A 
central lesson of our decisions is that significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face 
of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”). 
 249. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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those prayers that proselytize or disparage”?250 
In general, the government has greater authority to control who 
speaks and on what topics when the speech occurs in a nonpublic forum.  
Because the forum is not generally open to the public, the government 
can preserve the forum for its intended purposes: “Implicit in the 
concept of the nonpublic forum is the right [of the government] to make 
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker 
identity.”251  Similarly, if the government creates a designated limited 
forum, it may restrict the forum “for a limited purpose such as use by 
certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subject.”252  Although 
the government must remain viewpoint neutral under both types of 
forum, the proposed model policy does not favor any religious 
viewpoint over any other.  By inviting all established religions to 
participate, the government opens the prayer opportunity to all.  This 
may privilege religion over nonreligion because atheists and agnostics 
are not invited, but Marsh, in allowing legislative prayer generally, held 
that the Establishment Clause permits this type of “discrimination” in 
favor of legislative prayers. 
Thus, given the unique history of invocations under the First 
Amendment, the government can create a legislative prayer forum with 
the same Establishment Clause limitations that Marsh imposes on the 
government when it is the speaker—no proselytizing or disparaging any 
one religion.  By allowing a variety of religious viewpoints and 
prohibiting proselytizing and disparaging prayers, the government 
insures neutrality between and among religions: “[T]he [Establishment 
Clause’s] guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the 
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends 
benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including 
religious ones, are broad and diverse.”253  And, as Marsh recognizes, 
allowing legislative prayers is a “tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs 
widely held among the people of the country” or the local  
community.254  Of course, the government cannot interject itself into the 
forum in such a way that it favors particular religious speakers or 
particular religious viewpoints, but the Establishment Clause does not 
prevent the government from restricting the start of its meetings to the 
intended purpose: “[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a public body 
 250. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 1998) (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 251. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. 
 252. Id. at 46. 
 253. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839. 
 254. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
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entrusted with making the laws.”255 
In a designated limited or nonpublic forum, then, the government can 
preclude certain types of speakers or prayers, as in Turner and Snyder, 
provided that the proffered prayer falls outside the viewpoint neutral 
parameters that the government set in creating the forum.  Prayers that 
either disparage the religious beliefs of others or proselytize in relation 
to a particular faith go beyond the historical context that supported 
legislative prayer in the first instance.256  As Marsh instructs, legislative 
prayer by itself neither is “a proselytizing activity” nor does it 
“symbolically plac[e] the government’s ‘official seal of approval on one 
religious view.’”257  Instead, “it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of 
beliefs widely held among the people of this country.”258 
But even if legislative prayer does not encroach on free speech 
principles, it still must pass Establishment Clause review.  When the 
government opens a forum and permits religious groups to use that 
forum,259 the Court has applied the endorsement test, and as evidenced 
by Allegheny, is apt to do so with respect to legislative prayer.  To 
determine whether there is an unconstitutional endorsement, courts 
evaluate the message the government conveys to a reasonable observer 
who is aware of the history and context of the government activity.260  
But to understand the government’s message under the model policy, 
one cannot consider a single prayer in isolation.  While a Presbyterian 
minister might give a prayer one week, an imam might provide the 
invocation at the next meeting.  Thus, a court must consider the entire 
prayer policy, not just individual prayers in isolation: 
Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the crèche . . .  
is not neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday setting changes what 
viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display—as a 
typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of a 
 255. Id. 
 256. There is a threat that, in determining whether a proposed prayer proselytized or disparaged, 
the government would be reviewing the content of prayers and, therefore, would become “entangled” 
with religion.  But to the extent this is a problem, it is one that Marsh considered and resolved in favor 
of legislative prayer.  Recall that in rejecting the dissent’s argument, the Marsh majority noted that 
“[t]he unbroken practice [of legislative prayer] for two centuries in the National Congress . . . gives 
abundant assurance that there is no real threat ‘while this Court sits.’”  Id. at 795 (quoting Panhandle Oil 
Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 257. Id. at 792. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 838–40 (1995). 
 260. See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–20 (2010) (The endorsement “test requires the 
hypothetical construct of an objective observer who knows all of the pertinent facts and circumstances 
surrounding the symbol and its placement.”). 
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religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that content.261 
As in the museum context, the reasonable observer must consider 
individual prayers within the context of the model policy itself and the 
long-standing tradition of legislative prayer.  A reasonable observer who 
is aware of the history and context of the model policy would know that: 
(1) the government invites religious leaders from all religious groups 
with an established presence in the community on a first-come, first-
serve basis; (2) no religious leader is permitted to offer a prayer at 
consecutive meetings or more than twice in a calendar year; (3) the 
government neither reviews nor edits the prayers; and (4) the model 
policy is intended to acknowledge and express the government’s respect 
for the diversity of religious denominations and faiths represented and 
practiced among its citizens. 
Although the policy does not neutralize the religious import of a 
particular sectarian invocation, the overall policy necessarily alters the 
observer’s understanding of the purpose of the policy.  Given the 
diversity of the religions represented, the reasonable observer cannot 
simply add up the various allegedly sectarian references and attribute 
them to the government.  Rather, the breadth of the model policy 
demonstrates the government’s respect for all faiths and religions in the 
community without making any person’s religious views relevant to that 
person’s standing in the political community.262  That is, because the 
prayer opportunity is open to all established religions in the community, 
the model policy does not “send[] a message to non-adherents that they 
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”263 
Instead of excluding or disparaging certain religions, the policy 
“recognize[s] the rich religious heritage of our country in a fashion that 
was designed to include members of the community, rather than to 
proselytize.”264  Consistent with Simpson, the model policy promotes the 
 261. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 262. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630 
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Under the endorsement test, the ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice 
is relevant not because it creates an ‘artificial exception’ from that test.  On the contrary, the ‘history and 
ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer 
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion.”). 
 263. Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).  See also 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 850 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The widely divergent viewpoints of these 
many purveyors of opinion, all supported on an equal basis by the [government], significantly 
diminishes the danger that the message of any one publication is perceived as endorsed by the 
[government].”). 
 264. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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“participation by persons of all faiths in public life.”265  That the 
opportunity is not open to the nonreligious does not contravene the 
Establishment Clause because, as Marsh notes, “the delegates did not 
consider opening prayers as a proselytizing activity of symbolically 
placing the government’s ‘official seal of approval on one religious 
view.’”266  Thus, even though legislative prayer might allow for special 
accommodation of religion, its “unique history” poses “no real threat to 
the Establishment Clause.”267 
Of course, if the government creates a designated open forum in 
which any member of the community (selected on a neutral basis, e.g., 
selected at random or on a first-come, first-serve basis) could speak at 
the start of each meeting,268 then the threat of an Establishment Clause 
problem disappears.  The government does not endorse religion over 
non-religion or one sect over another by opening the forum to everyone.  
In fact, if the forum is truly open to all speakers, the Establishment 
Clause prohibits the government’s excluding religious speakers because 
to do so would show hostility to religion: “[I]f a State refused to let 
religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate 
not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”269  Put differently, by 
creating a designated open forum, the government would relinquish its 
ability to designate part of the meeting for legislative prayer.  Marsh, 
therefore, would have no application.  Some speakers might give 
sectarian invocations, others nonsectarian, and still others political or 
non-religious statements—none of which would violate the 
Establishment Clause because a reasonable observer who is aware of the 
history and context would know that the government had opened the 
forum to all speakers.  Thus, absent some other constitutional problem 
with the speech, such as obscenity or fighting words, the legislative 
invocations would be beyond the control or censorship of the 
government. 
 265. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 266. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 442 (1961)). 
 267. Id. at 791. 
 268. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (“The 
government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by 
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”). 
 269. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990); Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272–75 (1981) (noting that if a state-created forum is “generally” and “equally” 
open to religious and non-religious groups, then permitting religious groups to have access to the forum 
does not have a primary effect of advancing religion). 
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CONCLUSION 
The mention of legislative prayer, whether sectarian or nonsectarian, 
tends to strike an emotional chord with people.  Such public prayer, for 
better or worse, takes that which is highly personal for some and 
displays it in a public setting that is created and controlled by the 
government.  In addition to its emotional impact, legislative prayer 
raises complex constitutional issues at the intersection of the Free 
Speech and Establishment Clauses.  Although Marsh began exploring 
this intersection, the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on the 
endorsement test relegated Marsh to the status of an exception to the 
Court’s traditional Establishment Clause rules.  But Summum now 
requires courts to reconsider this established interpretation of Marsh.  In 
light of the Court’s unanimous adoption of the government speech 
doctrine, Marsh takes on new and broader significance as a majority of 
the Court is poised to expand the government’s ability to accommodate 
religion in the public sphere.  In particular, the current “conservative” 
majority of the Court appears ready to follow Justice Kennedy’s dissent 
in Allegheny, recognizing that: 
Marsh stands for the proposition, not that specific practices common in 
1791 are an exception to the otherwise broad sweep of the Establishment 
Clause, but rather that the meaning of the Clause is to be determined by 
reference to historical practices and understandings.  Whatever test we 
choose to apply must permit not only legitimate practices two centuries 
old but also any other practices with no greater potential for an 
establishment of religion.270 
After Summum, the appropriate test for facially religious speech is 
Marsh’s impermissible intent test, not the endorsement test.  To 
determine whether the government is speaking, courts must look at the 
level of control that the government has over the speech.  If the 
government has “final approval authority” and exercises “effective[] 
control,” then the message is the government’s.271  That is, when 
speaking, the government has the right to convey the message that it 
“view[s] as appropriate for the place in question, taking into account 
such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture.”272  
And, under Marsh, this is also true for facially religious government 
speech, such as legislative prayers.  The “unique history” of legislative 
invocations demonstrates that such prayers are consistent with the 
 270. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 271. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2010). 
 272. Id. 
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Founders’ understanding of the Establishment Clause.273  As a result, 
courts are not to parse the content of the prayer—i.e., to look at the 
specific sectarian or nonsectarian language used—absent evidence that 
the government intended to exploit the prayer opportunity to proselytize 
or promote one religion over another.274  That is, if the government 
simply intends to participate in the long-standing tradition of legislative 
prayer, “it is not for [courts] to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to 
parse the content of a particular prayer.”275 
Moreover, if a Presbyterian minister’s delivering of Judeo–Christian 
prayers is “simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 
among the people of this country,”276 then so too are prayers—even 
sectarian ones—given by diverse religious leaders from the community.  
By allowing all religious leaders to pray consistently with their 
respective faith traditions, the government celebrates all such faiths and 
allows each to express its rich religious tradition through the opening 
prayer.  And the government’s desire to respect all the faiths in any 
given community is consistent with the requirements of the 
Establishment Clause as interpreted by Marsh,277 Salazar,278 
Pelphrey,279 Turner,280 and Simpson.281 
Thus, in light of Summum, Marsh is no longer an outlier but instead 
stands as a cornerstone in the Court’s Establishment Clause 
 273. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S 783, 790 (1983). 
 274. In fact, if Marsh precluded any and all sectarian references, then many of the prayers that the 
United States Senate chaplain gives would be unconstitutional under Allegheny and its progeny.  The 
Senate chaplain’s prayers have included such expressions as “We pray this in the name of our Lord and 
Savior, Jesus Christ,” “in Jesus’ name,” and “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, god of our Lord Jesus 
Christ.”  See REVEREND RICHARD C. HALVERSON, PRAYERS OFFERED BY THE CHAPLAIN OF THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 98-43 (1984). 
 275. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.  Justice Kennedy also expressed the same concern in his dissent in 
Allegheny: “Obsessive, implacable resistance to all but the most carefully scripted and secularized forms 
of accommodation requires this Court to act as censor, issuing national decrees as to what is orthodox 
and what is not.”  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 677–78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 276. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
 277. Id. at 786 (“From colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever since, the 
practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious 
freedom.”). 
 278. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (“The Constitution does not oblige 
government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”). 
 279. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘impermissible 
motive’ standard does not require that all faiths be allowed the opportunity to pray.  The standard instead 
prohibits purposeful discrimination.”). 
 280. Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
legislative prayers that “recognize[] the rich religious heritage of our country in a fashion that was 
designed to include members of the community, rather than to proselytize”). 
 281. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Sup’rs, 404 F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(acknowledging our nation’s “commitment to participation by persons of all faiths in public life”). 
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jurisprudence.  Federal, state, and local governmental entities may 
participate in “the unambiguous and unbroken practice of . . . opening 
legislative session with prayer” without violating the Establishment 
Clause, even if such prayers contain sectarian references.282  That a 
reasonable observer may feel disaffected by a prayer policy does not 
show that the government’s intended message violates the Establishment 
Clause; it shows only that the message has a certain effect on that 
observer.  But this reaction by some observers simply is not sufficient to 
create an Establishment Clause violation: “We do not doubt the sincerity 
of those, who like respondent, believe that to have prayer in this context 
risks the beginning of the establishment the Founding Fathers feared.  
But this concern is not well founded.”283  If a reasonable observer 
dislikes the practice, the observer can exercise, what Summum takes to 
be, a primary check on government speech—the right to vote for new 
officials who will change or discontinue the prayer policy.284  Subject to 
this electoral check, though, Marsh leaves the decision whether to have 
legislative prayer—be it sectarian or nonsectarian—to the government 
speaker.  And because Marsh is no longer an exception, the government 
is also free to adopt other “policies of accommodation, 
acknowledgment, and support for religion”285 that are “deeply 
embedded in the history and tradition of this country”286 without 
violating the Establishm
 282. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
 283. Id. at 795. 
 284. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“And of course, a 
government entity is ultimately ‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy.’  
‘If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.’” 
(quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))). 
 285. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 286. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. 
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